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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Army that emerged from the Cold War was largely an untested one, a 
condition which would quickly be altered by deployments throughout the 1990s.  First in 
Panama, then in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and elsewhere, the mettle of American 
soldiers, quality of the army’s doctrine, and aptitude of its leaders would be tested in the 
crucible of combat.  The results were not always flattering and often challenged officers’ 
perceptions of the army, foreign policy, and the nature of future combat.   
This thesis studies the lesson learning of field-grade and general officers in the 
U.S. Army during American's Small Wars of the 1990s.  The purpose of this work is to 
identify and explain points of consensus and disagreement with and between the army’s 
official histories, generals’ memoirs, and professional publications of field grade 
officers.  It is composed of three case studies in which the lessons of army officers are 
compared and contrasted.  The first case study is an examination of the army’s 
involvement in the invasion of Panama.  The second case study explores U.S. 
involvement in Somalia.  The final case study investigates the army’s experience in 
Kosovo.  It concludes that lessons learned by army officers were affected by their 
perspective which was a function of their generational affiliation and professional rank. 
Additionally, it concludes that U.S. Army’s experience during the 1990s serves as a 
useful analog for understanding the challenges facing today’s army.  It recommends that 
senior army and civilian leaders should recognize that each generation has relative 
strengths and weaknesses to be harnessed and mitigated, and that that dissent and 
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alternative viewpoints should be valued and encouraged – even in hierarchical 
organizations such as the army.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
1989.  It was the dawn of a new era.  The Soviet Union was on the verge of 
collapse, capitalism and democracy seemed to be secured, and the United States had 
few, if any, significant strategic adversaries.  Pax Americana seemed poised to reign 
across the globe and many Americans clamored to collect their hard-earned “peace 
dividend.”1  The strength, resiliency, and growth of Western democracies, fueled by 
capitalism, seemed to vindicate their superiority over communism and socialism in 
nearly all regards, including military power.  Some observers went so far as to say it was 
the end of history.2  Yet even before the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union 
dramatically collapsed, some were already celebrating.  Army Chief of Staff, General 
Carl E. Vuono assessed the army’s condition in 1987: 
I think we start with the quality soldiers we have—and thanks to your 
committee [the Senate Committee on Armed Services] and Congress, we 
have the best soldiers we have had in a number of years.  I will not 
recount all the statistics on that.  I think they are all well-known. 
 
I think we have a sound how-to-fight doctrine for the Army, built on 
preparing the Army to carry out its role in joint operations.  I think we 
have training programs in place that are solid. 
 
I think our modernization effort, both organizationally and systemwise 
[sic], has been a sound avenue for us.  Finally, I think the real strength 
                                                 
1 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at the Richard Nixon Library Dinner” (speech, Yorba Linda, CA, March 
11, 1992), U.S. Government Publishing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1992-book1/pdf/PPP-
1992-book1-doc-pg428.pdf. 
   
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 2006 ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), 211.   
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that we have in our Army has been the development of our leaders over 
the past several years, both noncommissioned officers and officers.3  
 
Unknown to Vuono, his confidence in the resurgent army would be thoroughly 
tried in the coming decade.  First in Panama, then in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and 
elsewhere, the mettle of American soldiers, quality of the army’s doctrine, and aptitude 
of its leaders would be tested in the crucible of combat.  The results were not always 
flattering and prompted some officers to challenge Vuono’s assessment.  Through their 
own experiences and their study of the army’s performance during the 1990s many 
officers developed conflicting and competing narratives.  They argued that the progress 
Vuono and others lauded was illusory and the army’s doctrine and leadership seemed 
unable to cope with the rapidly evolving environment in which the army found itself 
operating.  The result was a decade of heated debate between officers over the future of 
the army.   
 As the debate progressed and rhetorical battle were lines drawn, officers filtered 
into one of two camps – they either believed that the army was adapting to respond to 
new conditions, or that it was not (or at least not sufficiently and quickly enough).  How 
these officers viewed the army’s evolution was more than just a vote of confidence or 
skepticism in reforms, it was also an indication of their attitudes towards the broader 
institution and its leadership.  While support of these positions ebbed and flowed 
                                                 
3 “Statement of General Carl E. Vuono, Nominee to be Chief of Staff, Army,” 10 June 1987 in Douglas D. 
Brisson, ed., A Trained and Ready Army: Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of Staff, United States 
Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), 3. 
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throughout the decade based on the outcome of each conflict and officers’ interpretations 
of them, a discernable pattern emerged.   
To field-grade officers of the 1990’s, the military interventions were foundational 
experiences.  These officers relied on their experiences and studies of these conflicts to 
inform their notions of modern conflict and combat and in so doing, rejected the popular 
view that future conflicts would resemble the Gulf War.  While they believed the army 
was largely successful in accomplishing its mission, their analysis tended to be critical.      
Conversely, senior officers, shaped by their involvement in the Vietnam War and 
subsequent rebuilding of the army, were less effected by the army’s campaigns during 
the 1990s. To them, the post-Cold War interventions were confirmatory rather than 
foundational and their analysis was more likely to focus on what went right during 
operations than what went wrong.  Their views of the army’s performance supported 
their overarching conclusion that the army was effectively evolving and was well-
prepared to face the post-Cold War World.   
This divergence in perspective touches on several lines of historical inquiry.  The 
U.S. Army, in particular, places great emphasis on the value of learning lessons from 
history so that future officers will make the correct decisions and avoid their 
predecessors’ mistakes.4  But who is empowered with learning the lessons?  Is the U.S. 
                                                 
4 For examples of the importance that the army places on lesson learning see US Department of the Army, 
Establishing a Lessons Learned Program, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 11-33 
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL 2011); Kenneth E. Hamburger, Learning Lessons in the American 
Expeditionary Forces (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History); Dennis J. 
Vetock, “Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army 
Military History Institute, 1988).   
 4 
 
Army’s institutional memory of events and their interpretation only found in the official 
historians and generals’ memoirs? Is the disjunction between generals’ and field grade 
officers’ conclusions about the lessons of combat typical of post-operational analysis?  
How does a hierarchical, authoritarian military organization like the U.S. Army 
institutionalize dissent, encourage critical thinking, and avoid group-think? 
The purpose of this research is to identify points of consensus and disagreement 
with and between the official histories produced by the U.S. Army, generals’ memoirs, 
and field grade officers’ works. This research is part of the broader inquiry of how 
military organizations evolve and adapt over time. It also sheds light on the internal 
dynamics of the officer corps, on how institutions assimilate ‘lessons’ from recent 
conflicts, and how the U.S. Army gathers, analyzes, and internalizes new information 
and experiences.  Connected to the broader lines of inquiry outlined above, this thesis 
endeavors to answer the following research questions:  How did the U.S. experience in 
Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo effect army officers’ perception of the army’s ability to 
accomplish its missions?  How did these experiences alter their views on foreign policy?  
How did these conflicts effect the perception of army organization, training, doctrine, 
and leadership during the 1990s?  Lastly, how and why did these officers’ lessons 
learned differ from the official army lessons learned?  
The answers to these questions are important to our understanding of U.S. 
military history as well as to our understating of contemporary military issues.  The 
1990s army faced many challenges that are closely related to challenges faced by today’s 
army – such as budget cuts and drawdowns in the face of increased responsibilities 
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abroad.  This period encompassed in this study contained not only these three major 
military operations, but military drawdowns, budgetary constraints, force restructuring, 
an ongoing debate about the impact of the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” and a heated 
debate over the nature and scope of future land combat.  Thus the army of the past helps 
us understand the army of today and make inferences about the future.  
To answer these questions this thesis examined three major sources.  The first 
was the U.S. Army’s ‘in-house’ or official studies of the campaigns.  The second group 
of sources were the memoirs, biographies, and professional writings of general officers.  
The third were papers written by mid-level officers at the Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.  CGSC, as a formal post-secondary educational institution was 
founded to “train junior officers in professional military subjects, particularly small-unit 
tactics.”5  As the study and practice of war advanced, the curriculum of the school 
expanded to teach “competence in handling large formations, mastery of problem-
solving and decision-making skills, and confidence in those skills.”6  During the Cold 
War, the College encouraged exceptional officers to extend their studies either by 
writing research papers or applying for a master’s degree and writing a thesis.  In the 
early 1980s the army’s new doctrine, AirLand Battle, introduced the concept of 
operational art. Operational art placed far more emphasis on adaptable, innovative, and 
                                                 
5 Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and 
the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, CT: 1978), 3. 
 
6 Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in 
World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 63. 
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critically-thinking commanders and staffs which necessitated the development of an 
additional course.  In 1982 the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) was 
established to “raise the bar of the general understanding of warfare in the officer corps 
of the U.S. Army” by “[developing] a shared experience of theory, history, doctrine, 
political science, and practical experience…”7 As part of their curriculum, SAMS 
students were required to conduct extensive research as well as publish white papers, 
articles, and monographs.8  Together with the CGSC research papers and masters’ 
theses, these papers provide a unique and valuable source for studying the mid-level 
officer perspective.  The addition of these mid-level officer sources to the official 
histories and the generals’ accounts allow us to reach an understanding of the officer 
corps’ perspectives that we would otherwise be unable to attain.   
There are many histories of the post-Cold War armed forces but precious few 
that examine America’s “small wars” of the 1990s.  However, each campaign has an 
official history published by the army and a corresponding Department of the Army 
Historical Summary (DAHSUM).  The official histories and the DAHSUMs share 
limitations.  They tend to be conservative consensus operational histories that rarely 
arrive at surprising or controversial conclusions and their scopes tend to be limited. 9  
                                                 
7 Kevin Benson, “School of Advanced Military Studies Commemorative History: 1984-2009” 
(Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 54.      
  
8 Harry Ball, Of Responsible Command, 1994 ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the 
United States Army War College, 1984), 463. 
 
9 For an example of the limited scope of the official histories see Richard Stewart, War in the Persian 
Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm August 1990-March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Center of 
Military History United States Army, 2010).  His analysis finds that U.S. units simply moved faster, were 
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Most important to this study, these documents often do not study the lessons learned 
from the conflicts.  Those that do, tend to focus on ways to improve lethality and combat 
power.  Overall, they illustrate an army that slowly, steadily, and deftly adapted to and 
overcame the new obstacles it faced in the closing decade of the 20th Century.  In 
addition to the official histories, there are extensive journalistic and historical literature 
on these military operations, the post-Cold War national security debate, and the role of 
the U.S. Army.  As one would expect, the viewpoints in these documents vary 
considerably.  Some heap praise on the resurgent army while others mercilessly critique 
every mishap.  While valuable, these sources suffered from the same flaw as most 
journalistic accounts.  By virtue of their temporal proximity to the events these works 
provide an almost real-time account, but often lack the depth and sources of more 
complete histories.  Outside of the official histories and journalistic accounts, these 
“small wars” largely failed to attract the academic rigor associated with other U.S. 
military ventures, primarily due to the Persian Gulf War’s proximity and scope.    
Finally, there are numerous memoirs by key participants, including many general 
officers.  But as historian Andrew Bacevich points out, the modern American military 
memoir has been reduced to little more than a trope.10  Lastly, there is a limitation shared 
across virtually all of the secondary sources of this era - almost none study or reflect the 
perspective of mid-level officers.   
                                                 
more lethal, and that individual soldiers were better trained and equipped than their Iraqi counterparts.  
 
10 Andrew Bacevich, “A Modern Major General,” review of American Soldier, by Tommy Franks and 
Malcolm McConnell, New Left Review 29, (September-October 2004): 125-126. 
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The field officer perspective provides an essential, but often overlooked 
perspective on the state of the U.S. Army during this tumultuous decade. Field-grade 
officers are the vital link between junior officers, soldiers, and general officers.  The 
typical junior officer or soldier often lacks the experience and perspective required to 
place their personal experiences in the greater context of the army at large.  At the other 
end of the spectrum is the senior officer, with a wealth of experience and perspective, 
but minimal contact with the soldiers actually fighting the battles.  The field-grade 
officer, having served for eight to fourteen years, has developed his or her professional 
skills, experienced multiple operations (training and otherwise), has been exposed to the 
strategic and operational components to the army, yet retains their connection to soldiers 
and actual warfighting.  Field-grade officers then, bridge the gap between the tip of the 
spear and headquarters.  They possess a unique blend of experience, professional 
education, and closeness to combatants, which makes their perceptions exceptionally 
valuable to scholars studying the military or conflicts in which they were involved. For 
these reasons, their perspective on the U.S. Army’s evolution in the decade prior to the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) is unique and important.  Recognizing this gap in the 
historiography, this work adds the voices and perspectives of field grade officers to our 
understanding of the turbulent 1990s.   
This thesis offers three central arguments.  First, that despite the outward 
appearance of service consensus, the decade of the 1990s was characterized by a wide, 
varied, and passionate internal debate amongst officers at all levels about the future of 
ground combat operations.  Second, general officers viewed their experiences in the late 
9 
1980s and early 1990s positively and as affirmations of doctrine and the American way 
of war.   Third, the conflicts of the 1990s profoundly impacted the perceptions and 
attitudes of many field-grade officers, and created a schism between their views, the 
general officers’ views, and the army’s official positions. 
This study is comprised of three case studies of US Army interventions:  Panama 
1989-1990, Somalia 1992-1995, and Kosovo 1998-1999.11 Each chapter is divided into 
four sections.  The first section summarizes each conflict and provides relevant 
background information.  The second section of each chapter discusses the official 
lessons learned as published by the U.S. Army.  The third section examines the lessons 
learned from the conflict by general officers.  The fourth and final section of each 
chapter examines lessons learned by field-grade officers in each of the conflicts.   
Although nearly two decades removed from the writing of this thesis, the events 
of the 1990s are still relevant today.  Then, as now, the army finds itself in an era of 
dwindling budgets, reduction in forces, transformation, and debate over the nature of 
future conflict.  After more than a decade at war across the greater Middle East the army 
is seemingly at a crossroads.  Despite the challenges it faces, there seems to be little 
respite in store for the army as signaled by President Trump’s inaugural address: “We 
will reinforce old alliances and form new ones – and unite the civilized world against 
radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the 
11 This thesis omits the Persian Gulf War for two reasons.  Firstly, the scale of U.S. involvement and its 
impact on officer perception is large enough to merit its own study.  Secondly, the U.S. combat experience 
in Iraq and Kuwait was an aberration for the decade.  Taken together, these two considerations illustrate 
how the Persian Gulf War’s status as a significant outlier could adversely affect this thesis and its 
conclusions.  
10 
Earth.”12  We would do well then to learn from those who have gone before in similar 
circumstances. 
12 David Sherfinski, “Donald Trump: We will ‘eradicate’ ‘radical Islamic Terrorism’ ‘from the face of the 
Earth,’” The Washington Times, January 20 2017, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/20/donald-trump-we-will-eradicate-radical-islamic-ter/. 
11 
CHAPTER II 
WINNING THE WAR AND IGNORING THE PEACE:  ARMY OFFICERS’ 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. INVASION OF PANAMA 
 The fall of the Berlin Wall and rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989  
caught military analysts and political prognosticators flat-footed.  There was little doubt  
in the minds of American leaders that the U.S. would ultimately prevail in the Cold War,  
but no one had predicted such a rapid and widespread collapse. Although the Soviet threat 
had dissipated, American policymakers now faced a large number of disparate regional 
adversaries.   One such area of concern for the United States was Central and South 
America.  Under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the U.S. had taken an 
active and often times interventionist role in the region.  In the closing decades of the 
20th century this role included unsavory and sometimes contradictory actions, such as 
funding anti-narcotics operations in one country while simultaneously providing aid and 
material support to narcotic-friendly leaders in another.13 The United States Army had 
often been employed as a tool of foreign policy in Latin America, but was it an 
appropriate one in the post-Cold War era?  It was designed to defeat massed Soviet 
armored-columns attacking through Central and Western Europe.  How would such an 
army contend with a vastly different adversary in a vastly different environment?  Could 
a Cold War army operate effectively in a post-Cold War World?  Was the army truly 
13  For an overview of U.S. and Latin American relations throughout history see, Gregory B. Weeks, U.S. 
and Latin American Relations, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015); Michael Conniff, Panama and the 
United States: The Forced Alliance, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001); Michael E. Donoghue, 
Borderlands on the Isthmus: Race, Culture, and the Struggle for the Canal Zone, (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014).   
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prepared to “carry out its role in join operations” as U.S. Army Chief of Staff Carl 
Vuono contended? 14    
 These and many other questions confronted U.S. Army officers as they prepared 
for, executed, and later interpreted the legacy and impact of the U.S. invasion of 
Panama.  As we will examine, the legacy of Operation Just Cause is as interesting as it 
is contentious.  Many officers viewed the operation as nearly perfect, noting that U.S. 
forces were able to quickly overwhelm its opponents and achieve its objectives at a 
relatively low cost.  Other officers argued that the U.S. intervention in Panama 
foreshadowed some of the problems the army faced in the post-Cold War world.  
Prelude to Conflict 
 The completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 made Panama critically important 
to the economic and military power of the United States.  To Panamanians, the canal was 
a mixed blessing.  On one hand it brought development and access to a worldwide trade 
network while on the other it incited external (mostly American) influence and 
imposition into Panamanian affairs.  For a time, the shared interests in the Panama Canal 
was enough to ease any strain to Panamanian-U.S. relations.  But in the 1980s these 
interests began to diverge when the de facto leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, was 
implicated in election tampering and several murders in 1984.  Although the United 
States had been aware of Noriega’s illegal activities from his time as a CIA informant 
                                                 
14 “Statement of General Carl E. Vuono, Nominee to be Chief of Staff, Army,” 10 June 1987 in Douglas 
D. Brisson, ed., A Trained and Ready Army: Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of Staff, United 
States Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), 3. 
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dating back to the 1960s, the public nature of his actions in 1984 and increasingly anti-
American rhetoric eroded the political will to continue supporting him and precipitated 
the slide toward a U.S.-Panamanian conflict.      
 The political crisis came to a head during the Panamanian election of 1989.  
Despite Noriega’s and his supporters’ involvement in widespread election fraud, the 
opposition leader appeared to win in a landslide.  Noriega dismissed the election results 
as illegitimate due to illegal American influence.  The U.S. imposed economic sanctions 
and conducted two high-profile military training exercises – Operation Sand Fleas and 
Operation Purple Storm – that were equal parts provocation and preparation for what 
many senior U.S. military leaders believed was an inevitable military confrontation in 
Panama.15  Noriega, unwilling or unable to back down from U.S. pressure authorized (or 
at least condoned) the harassment of U.S. personnel across Panama.  Tensions boiled 
over and turned deadly on 16 December 1989 when U.S. marine 1LT Robert Paz was 
killed and two hostages taken by Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) at a roadblock in 
Panama City.16  With nearly 35,000 American citizens within the Panama Canal Zone in 
danger and U.S. interests threatened, President George H.W. Bush’s patience ran out.   
 
 
 
                                                 
15  Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, 
(New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 49-51.   
 
16  Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama 
February 1988 – January 1990, (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 73.  
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Operation Just Cause – The Plan 
 The objectives in Panama were ambitious and numerous: kill or capture Noriega, 
protect U.S. military assets and personnel, neutralize the PDF, rescue American 
hostages, free political prisoners, and protect the Panama Canal.  Merely achieving these 
objectives would be a laudable goal, but political necessity required the military not only 
to achieve them, but achieve them rapidly and decisively.  Luckily for American military 
planners, the gradual degradation of U.S.-Panamanian relations allowed them to begin 
planning the invasion of Panama in 1987, a full two years before hostilities 
commenced.17  The large lead-time provided the military an ample opportunity to plan 
the invasion in great detail.  The military’s plan, eventually named Operation Just 
Cause, required nearly 30,000 U.S. military personnel (of which approximately 23,000 
were army soldiers) to assault 27 targets in the opening hour of the conflict.   
 As the largest contributor of forces in the conflict, many of the most critical 
missions were assigned to the army.  Army units from the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th 
Infantry Division, 7th Special Forces Group (SFG), 75th Ranger Regiment, and other 
smaller units were ordered to secure U.S. military facilities and protect U.S. dependents 
within Panama, capture or kill key PDF leadership including Noriega, rescue Kurt Muse 
(an American imprisoned by Noriega for aiding his political rivals), seize the Torrijos 
and Tocumen airports, assault Fort Amador, neutralize the garrison at Rio Hato, and 
assault the PDF headquarters facility known as  La Comandancia – all within the first 
                                                 
17  Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, Operation Just Cause, 15-18.  
 
15 
few hours of the operation.18  After the primary objectives were secured the units would 
transition to securing their secondary objectives, “mop-up” any remaining resistance, 
and continue pursuit of Panamanian leadership if required.  Following cessation of 
hostilities the majority of army units would depart Panama.  The limited units that 
remained in Panama would then conduct Operation Promote Liberty, a “nation-building 
exercise designed to bolster the newly elected leadership in Panama.”19  Just Cause was 
designed to defeat and demoralize the PDF before it could mount an effective resistance, 
allowing U.S. forces to win quickly and avoid prolonged entanglement. Due to 
operational security concerns during the planning process other U.S. governmental 
agencies with substantial roles in post-conflict operations (the Department of State and 
the Department of Justice for example) were not integrated into the planning or 
execution of the operation.  With a detailed, if limited plan in place, United States 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) awaited the order to execute the invasion of 
Panama.       
Operation Just Cause 
On 17 December 1989 President Bush issued the order to invade Panama.  Forty-
eight hours after the order was issued, in the early morning hours of 20 December, 
American forces forced their way into Panama and the fight to oust Noriega had 
commenced.  Broadly speaking, the opening phase of Just Cause was executed 
18  Ibid., 77.  
19  Department of the Army, “Historical Summary: FYs 1990 & 1991,” (Washington D.C.: Department of 
the Army, 1991) 17-18. 
16 
according to plan.  Special forces units led the initial assault and seized several critical 
objectives as well as rescuing Kurt Muse.  Parachute infantry, supported by ten M551 
Sheridan tanks, seized their respective objectives while units stationed in Panama 
quickly secured American civilians and guarded key infrastructure.  The PDF, having 
been systematically desensitized to U.S. troop movements during dozens of U.S. 
exercises in the preceding months, largely ignored reports of a U.S. invasion until it was 
too late.  When the PDF was able to resist, they were quickly surrounded by U.S. 
military forces and forced to capitulate.  One such example was the PDF and 
paramilitary units defending La Comandancia.  After a brief but spirited defense they 
were quickly surrounded and subjected to a withering bombardment that destroyed much 
of the compound and forced their surrender.  Due to American military planners’ 
concerns over civilian casualties and collateral damage to infrastructure, the use of 
artillery and air power was constrained.  The constraints placed on US forces required 
tactical units to rely on armored vehicles during their assaults on several objectives, most 
notably in cities where precision firepower was required.  The PDF’s lack of anti-armor 
weapons allowed U.S. commanders to distribute armored vehicles such as Sheridans in 
small teams to support operations throughout Panama.  Armored vehicles were also used 
extensively after hostilities ceased to protect convoys, react to civil disturbances, and 
generally project American power.20  
20 Cole, Operation Just Cause. 
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Less than ten hours after the invasion of Panama commenced and before 
President Bush could address the nation, major hostilities had already ceased.  When 
President Bush was finally able to speak to the American people he outlined the 
objectives and causes of the American intervention: 
My fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to 
Panama. No President takes such action lightly. This morning I 
want to tell you what I did and why I did it. 
For nearly 2 years, the United States, nations of Latin America 
and the Caribbean have worked together to resolve the crisis in 
Panama. The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the 
lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat 
drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal 
treaty. Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis 
through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by the 
dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug 
trafficker.21 
Although some PDF and paramilitary units held out until 25 December 1989, by the end 
of the day almost all armed resistance had been eliminated. As military resistance 
dwindled, U.S. forces located Noriega who had requested sanctuary at the Vatican’s 
embassy.  On 3 January 1990 after several days of negotiations between American and 
Vatican officials, Noriega was surrendered into American custody and immediately 
extradited to the United States.  However, as combat ended, SOUTHCOM forces 
encountered looting, mass protests, arson, and general lawlessness.22  Although U.S. 
military units and Panamanian civil security forces were eventually able to impose law 
21 George H.W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Panama, 20 December 1989, 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3422 (accessed 28 September 2016). 
22  R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama, (Washington, D.C.; Army Center 
of Military History, 2004), 39.  
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and order, the period directly following combat operations caught SOUTHCOM 
unprepared and tarnished what was otherwise considered by many historians and 
military officers to be an outstanding military operation.        
On the face of it, Operation Just Cause seemed to be a resounding success.  All 
major military objectives were achieved at the relatively little cost of 23 U.S. servicemen 
killed and 322 wounded.23  On the other hand, PDF casualties were higher than expected 
with 297 killed, 123 wounded, and 468 detained.  Panamanian civilians also paid a hefty 
price for the U.S. invasion suffering an estimated 314 killed and unknown number of 
wounded either during the operation or in the subsequent violence.  In addition to the 
personnel lost, American actions caused considerable damage to some urban areas 
requiring American restitution or reconstruction.  The Panamanian costs, in terms of 
lives lost, property damaged and destroyed, and instability complicated the legacy of 
Just Cause and as we will see, influenced many authors’ interpretations of Just Cause.   
Army Lesson Learning in Panama 
As the largest combat mission for U.S. forces since Vietnam, Just Cause had the 
potential to teach the army many lessons about many different topics.  What were those 
lessons and who learned them?  Were there official lessons learned?  Did they agree or 
differ with the lessons learned by general and field grade officers that participated in the 
conflict or studied it after?  In simpler terms, what was the legacy of Just Cause?  The 
following chapter explores the lessons learned by general and field grade army officers 
23 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 65. 
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that either participated in the conflict, studied it as part of their Professional Military 
Education (PME), wrote about Panama in their memoirs, or spoke about it in their 
subsequent careers. 
The General Officer Perspective 
 As leaders within the army, the general officer perspective is an important one.  
Their attitudes and opinions shape the future of the army in many ways including 
training and equipping future forces.  In order to understand the legacy of Just Cause we 
must first start with understanding how the general officers viewed the U.S. invasion of 
Panama.  One of the difficulties in studying general officers’ perceptions about Just 
Cause is a comparative absence of source material from the most active participants.   
Another problem is that much of the generals’ analysis of Panama was colored by Desert 
Storm and Vietnam.   
 Those officers that did consider Just Cause interpreted the army’s experience in 
two ways.  The first was as the last victory of the Cold War U.S. Army.  The second 
interpretation posited that Panama was the first victory of the post-Cold War U.S. Army.  
The two competing views – Panama as vindication of the old or as foreshadowing 
something new – shaped general officers’ views of Panama.  The divergence in 
perspective was articulated by Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan: “For some, 
success in Panama and the Persian Gulf tended to reinforce the Cold War model of the 
Army.  But a more critical consideration of the events of 1989 and 1990-1991 provided 
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the catalyst for us to face change in two fundamental directions: new missions and new 
technologies.”24   
Stability Operations, Nation Building, and MOOTW 
 One focus of general officer analysis was the relevance of Panama to the army’s 
role in post-combat operations, or Military Operations Other than War [MOOTW].25  In 
the early 1990s MOOTWs were part of growing debate over the future of the army.  
Most officers looked upon MOOTW as a mission that had to be dealt with but they 
didn’t have to like it.   But a smaller group believed MOOTWs were an essential part of 
the army’s future mission that the army should and must embrace to remain relevant to 
U.S. national security.   The general officers’ perceptions of Panama illuminate some of 
this debate.    
 General Carl W. Stiner, Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task 
Force South (JTF South) claimed he was ordered by General Max Thurman to focus on 
combat operations and leave post-conflict operations to SOUTHCOM. In a book co-
written with Tom Clancy nearly a decade after the invasion of Panama, he questioned 
Thurman’s priorities:   
The combat part is the easier of the two [missions] because when you are 
shooting at someone, you are in control of the variables.  But, when you 
enter the nation-building phase you are not.  The new government is in 
control, and you have to respond to their needs and priorities.  For that 
                                                 
24 Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn 
From America’s Army, (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), 7.   
 
25 Authors varied in their use of terminology to describe the non-combat operations of the army.  Most 
authors used the era-appropriate term MOOTW, but others used terms such as nation-building, stability 
operations, post-conflict operations, and Civil-Military Operations (CMO).  For purposes of this work 
these terms are used interchangeably.  
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reason, the transition must be seamless, so there is no loss in momentum.  
And the planning for it must be integrated from the beginning.26 
 
Although he understood the importance and difficulty concerning stability operations, 
his assessment of Just Cause and its legacy did not address stability operations and 
instead focused on the army’s performance in combat.  He largely ignored the army’s 
performance in an area it didn’t excel in and chose to focus on one in which it did.  
Stiner’s uncritical attitude is typified by his comment: “I can’t say we really learned any 
lessons.  In my opinion, you only learn a lesson as a result of a big mistake, or when 
you’ve failed to anticipate an event somewhere along the line – training readiness, plan 
development, or the like – that could effect the mission.”27   
 Major General William M. Matz, Assistant Division Commander for Support of 
the 7th Infantry Division, recalled that in a post-operation review of the Mission Essential 
Task List (METL) “we had accomplished in JUST CAUSE about five or six of our key 
METL [tasks]. Two or three things like, I believe, river crossing, etc., obviously we 
didn't. But we reviewed our METL and thought that our METL was good and did not 
need to be changed.”  But in a revealing comment, he noted that although the division 
had been actively engaged in civil-military operations for several months after the 
operation “we did not feel that that should become an actual part of the division's 
primary METL. But certainly we would concentrate on that in the future in our 
                                                 
26  Carl Stiner and Tom Clancy, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (New York: Berkley Books, 
2002), 385.  
 
27  Ibid., 392.  
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operations and in our exercises.”28  Matz’s lesson from Panama was that post-conflict 
operations were tasks a unit must be trained to conduct but they were not mission 
essential.  Matz’s division commander, LTG Carmen Cavezza, Commanding General of 
the 7th Infantry Division during Just Cause, drew similar conclusions after the operation.  
In Panama, “The simple part is the military part: isolating, moving in, and securing.  But 
the getting out the pregnant women, and the lady with the dog, and the people who don’t 
want to go, and all those kind of things, just botch up the operation big-time.”29  What 
had surprised and frustrated him was: 
the aid problems. I kept looking for help in the civil affairs area, for more 
people to come in to relieve the combat troops, and they weren't 
forthcoming. We were getting some pressure from the Panamanian 
government. They were concerned about the security of the refugees. 
They were concerned about losing control in those little villages we put 
together, and I wanted to turn that over to the right kind of people and let 
them start working the social problems and get my troops out of there so 
they could do the other things that they needed to do. That seemed to take 
a while.30 
Yet despite this experience, he was dubious about the practicality of better preparing for 
MOOTW and post-occupation stability duties: “For training purposes. I am not sure I 
could ever train adequately. I think the best thing I could do is to make sure my leaders 
                                                 
28  Robert K. Wright, Larry Yates, and Joe Huddleston, “Oral History Interview of Major General William 
M. Matz,” 30 April 1992, http://www.history.army.mil/documents/panama/JCIT/JCIT98Z.htm (accessed 
28 September 2016).    
 
29 Robert K. Wright, Larry Yates, and Joe Huddleston, “Oral History Interview of Lieutenant General 
Carmen Cavezza,” 30 April 1992, http://www.history.army.mil/documents/panama/JCIT/JCIT97Z.htm, 
(accessed 28 September 2016).    
    
30  Ibid.  
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understand the possibility of having to do that, and incorporate it in our training, but not 
make it a METL task because it would consume all our training time” 31  Cavezza labeled 
stability operations training as “essential,” yet he stopped short of adding it to his METL 
because it would interfere with tactical training.  He remained convinced of the primacy 
of tactical training even when his Panamanian experience showed that the combat phase 
was likely to be followed by a much longer period of reconstruction.  In his view, post-
combat operations were someone else’s task, not the U.S. Army’s.    
 Stiner, Matz, and Cavezza all learned lessons about post-conflict operations 
following their involvement and study of Just Cause.  Broadly speaking, these officers 
understood that stability operations were important to the army but varied in the 
emphasis they placed on them.  Stiner, writing considerably after the fact, ultimately 
concluded that post-conflict operations were the most critical to the long-term 
accomplishment of the army’s missions.  On the other hand, Matz and Cavezza viewed 
MOOTW as a secondary priority and focused their training for combat operations, 
despite their conclusion that such operations were essential.  All of these officers learned 
lessons from Panama, but very few of these lessons seemed to impact the units involved 
in the operation or the army at large.  Merely a decade later in Iraq the army would make 
the same mistakes – inadequately planning and training for post-conflict operations 
while preparing to combat an overmatched adversary.  From the perspective of the U.S. 
Army’s post 9/11 operations, William “Buck” Kernan, a colonel in Panama, concluded: 
                                                 
31  Ibid.        
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Where we should have learned our lesson was those nineteen months of 
planning for JUST CAUSE.  That went like clockwork. The one thing we 
didn't plan for was the aftermath; the nation building aspect.  What are 
you going to do for stability operations; for post-kinetic operations? That 
was an afterthought. Now, you would have thought that we would have 
done a better job this time around because of lessons learned with regime 
change even though it was this small. There were an awful lot of lessons 
learned we could have taken to Iraq and we didn't do it.   
An awful lot could've been planned; an awful lot could've been done 
ahead of time to be postured to do this much more efficiently and 
effectively. Which just begs the question, “Why didn’t we do a better job 
going into Iraq recognizing we were going to take down the 
government?”32   
 
Proof of Progress 
 The generals that led the army into Panama were all Vietnam veterans.  Most 
were mid-level officers in Vietnam, and all had witnessed firsthand an ill-disciplined 
army without clear strategic objectives.  While they drew many lessons from their 
experience in Vietnam, one of the most important was that political and strategic goals 
should be linked.  This was especially true to General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff during Just Cause:  
The lessons I absorbed from Panama confirmed all my convictions over 
the preceding twenty years, since the days of doubt over Vietnam.  Have 
a clear political objective and stick to it.  Use all the force necessary, and 
do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes.33   
 
Whenever the military had a clear set of objectives, I pointed out – as in 
Panama, the Philippine coup, and Desert Storm – the result had been a 
success.  When the nation’s policy was murky or nonexistent – the Bay of 
Pigs, Vietnam, creating a Marine “presence” in Lebanon – the result has 
                                                 
32 Douglas V. Johnson, An Oral History of General Willian F. “Buck” Kernan, USA, Retired, ed. James R. 
Greenburg (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 2015), 80-81. 
 
33  Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, 2003 ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 
2003), 434. 
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been a disaster . . . We have learned the proper lessons from history.34 
 
Powell also concluded that the slow, methodical buildup of forces over time used in 
Vietnam was not conducive to victory: “Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the 
long run saves lives.  Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these 
rules the bedrock of my military counsel.35  There are several problems with Powell’s 
conclusions.  The first is that his “lessons” from Panama weren’t really from Panama.  
He used the army’s experience in Just Cause as a data point to confirm his preexisting 
views on the use of force and the linkage between strategic and political objectives.  
Secondly, there seems to be a gap between Powell’s vision of decisive force that ends 
wars quickly and decisive outcomes that achieve lasting political objectives.  In both 
Panama and Iraq, American armed forces defeated the enemy’s organized military units 
but failed to control rioting, violence, and a breakdown in law and order.  
 General Powell was not the only officer who interpreted Panama as redemption 
for Vietnam.  In 1983 the army had a small chance to show its improvements when it 
invaded Grenada.  While the operation was a success, the demons of Vietnam had not 
been fully exorcised.   Byzantine chains of command, technical limitations (especially 
regarding communication equipment), and lack of joint training prior to Urgent Fury all 
plagued Just Cause.36   Senior military and civilian leaders recognized the military’s 
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36  Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, 
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shortcomings and made strides to correct the deficiencies in the intervening time.  The 
most critical development came in 1986 when the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act was passed.  Goldwater-Nichols fundamentally changed the 
way in which the president received advice on military matters and streamlined the chain 
of command in joint operations.  As the first large scale use of force since both Urgent 
Fury and Goldwater-Nichols, Just Cause was a real-world test of the new command 
structure and increased emphasis on joint operations.37 
 Several general officers viewed Just Cause as a vindication of the military’s 
reforms (specifically Goldwater-Nichols) and the resources spent conducting joint 
training.  The most prominent was Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono, who told a 
Congressional committee in 1990 that the JCS had made “significant strides in planning 
and executing joint operations.”  Despite the army’s improved performance, Vuono 
warned: 
We must be cautious, however, in drawing proper lessons from this 
operation.  Some have already proclaimed it as the prototype for 
contingencies of the future.  As important as it is, JUST CAUSE 
represents but one type of contingency in which the United States may 
find itself.  It is a single point along the operational continuum that runs 
from peacetime competition to a major war.38 
 
 Vuono was not alone in his assessment of Just Cause.  General Gordon B. 
Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans during Panama, initially 
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38 “On the fiscal year 1991 Department pf the Army Budget,” 21 February 1990 in Douglas D. Brisson, 
ed., A Trained and Ready Army: The Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of Staff, United States 
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doubted the operation and recalled: “I told them [Carl Stiner and Gary Luck] that I 
thought my view was that it was just so complicated I just couldn‘t comprehend that they 
could pull it off.”39  Following the conflict Sullivan admitted:  
Well that shows how much I knew. . . . It was really very well executed.  
The whole thing was well executed.  There were some things we learned 
that we didn‘t like and we changed.  Some of them were training 
deficiencies or whatever, but generally it was flawless.  I think what we 
saw was 21st Century warfare for the first time.  Simultaneous 
applications of complementary capabilities and we literally shut a country 
down.40 
     These three general officers concluded the army had learned the correct 
lessons from Urgent Fury and the Vietnam War and the Just Cause validated its 
progress.  They saw what they wanted to see in Panama; a rapid and 
overwhelming force decisively achieving limited goals.  Conversely, they either 
ignored or failed to recognize things outside of their comfort zone such as post 
conflict rioting and the near complete lack of inter-agency cooperation.   
The Field-Grade Officer Perspective 
 The field grade officers who wrote on the Panama invasion were more 
ambivalent in their assessments of the army and its performance in Panama. Some field 
grade officers concluded the operation was a great success and vindicated the army’s 
progress and preparation. Major James Cashwell’s 1995 master’s thesis examined 
armored battalions’ preparedness for operations other than war by analyzing the efficacy 
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of armored units and tanks in several operations, including Just Cause.  He assessed that 
the “performance of the tank in OOTW [in Panama], operating as part of the combined 
arms team, was extremely successful.”41 Based on his assessment of the army’s 
performance, Cashwell assessed that the army’s "Battle Focused" approach to training 
provided a “solid platform from which to launch into both war and OOTW.”42  
Cashwell’s conclusions seemed to support Matz and Cavezza’s pre-conflict training 
focus and plans.    
 Other officers were far less impressed with the army’s training, planning, and 
execution of stability operations.  Major Melissa Applegate’s 1994 paper recognized the 
difficulties that faced commanders preparing for the invasion.  She contended that with 
limited training time and resources available commanders were required to make 
sacrifices in their training and could only accomplish essential training – which rarely 
included MOOTW tasks. But while Matz and Cavezza thought MOOTW required little 
specialized training or planning, Applegate didn’t.  She contended that many of the 
problems encountered in Panama were due to poor planning by the senior leaders.  
Applegate argued that General Frederick J. Woerner (SOUTHCOM commander from 
1987 to 1989): 
understood the need for the military to plan post-conflict support to 
Panama, but the planning done under his command was overcome by 
events as the crisis deepened. Despite JTF-South's detailed planning for 
OPLAN 90-2, plans to support operations in a post-conflict environment-
                                                 
41 James E. Cashwell, “Armored Battalion Preparedness for Operation Other Than War” (MA thesis, US 
Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 26.  
 
42 Ibid., iii. 
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-the longest phase that would ultimately have the greatest impact on U.S. 
ability to realize the strategic objective of promoting stability--were 
insufficient. When it came time to implement [the invasion], the U.S. 
failed to resource the effort adequately and ultimately paid the price. U.S. 
efforts at rebuilding a police force illustrate this inconsistency in 
commitment.43 
 
Applegate noted that after Woerner was replaced by Max Thurman before the invasion, 
post-conflict planning gave way to increased emphasis on combat operations.  She 
concluded a lesson of the Panama operation:    
[it is the] actions that fall outside the realm of the military invasion itself 
that have the most lasting impact on the country, and on U.S. interests as 
a whole. . . because the U.S. military was the most visible representative 
of U.S. intentions and was responsible to carry out the lion's share of 
post-conflict support to Panama, U.S. successes or failures reflect on the 
military itself, in this case, negatively.44 
        Major Christopher Baggot’s 1990 SAMS monograph echoed Applegate’s 
criticism of operational planners’ near exclusive focus on the combat phase of the 
operation with little to no planning effort devoted to the post-conflict plan:  
What these two [Urgent Fury and Just Cause] campaigns did not 
demonstrate was either an expertise in planning or conducting post-
conflict operations to advance the peace in a manner most favorable to 
U.S. long-term regional interests. This planning shortfall may be a result 
of an uncertainty in fixing responsibility. Is it the statesman or the soldier 
who plans the peace? Or, is there a dual obligation for this mission? . . . It 
is the responsibility of the CINC in conjunction with the appropriate 
governmental agencies to mold the military campaign triumph into a 
lasting regional strategic victory.45    
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Baggot raised a significant question – whose responsibility was it to plan for and 
conduct post-conflict operations?  Cavezza concluded it was someone else’s 
responsibility, Baggot disagreed, contending that it was the responsibility of both 
military and civilian leaders.  His analysis reinforced Applegate’s criticism that the 
generals were too fixated on operational planning and that they ignored both the political 
objectives of the mission and the consequences of their actions on the local and regional 
political, social, and economic conditions.   While Powell claimed Panama was a success 
due to the linkage of political and military goals, Baggot believed there was a profound 
disconnect between military and political goals. 
Applegate and Baggot identified what they believed was a flaw in the army’s 
planning process.  But why had army planners failed to address such a seemingly simple 
problem? Major Louis Morales 2007 study of Just Cause concluded the planning 
obstacles were the result of failures in service and joint doctrine.46  Major Charles 
Robinson also determined that “The doctrine in use before, during, and after the Panama 
crisis did not provide the ability to effectively implement foreign policy through unified 
interagency operations.”47  To Robinson, the primary problem was that: 
at each phase of the crisis, the natural tendencies of the 
superorganizations were allowed to overwhelm the ability to function in a 
unified and responsive fashion, focused on a clear objective. Even when 
the policy debates over feasibility and suitability are set aside, the 
implementation was so poor one can conclude that the failure to depose 
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Noriega without an invasion was a result of flawed execution. The post-
conflict problems are also a result of poor implementation from a national 
perspective.48 
 
Morales and Robinson both believed that although some progress had been made in joint 
and interagency operations since Vietnam and Urgent Fury, doctrine still failed to 
provide the guidance required to successfully conduct joint and interagency 
contingencies.    
  Although a relatively small number of field officers analyzed Just Cause, their 
conclusions were similar.  They argued that army training and doctrine did not place 
enough emphasis on MOOTW, a fact which was evident in the army’s execution of 
these tasks in Panama.   In their view, post-conflict operations were almost, if not more 
important, than the combat phases of Just Cause and that by bumbling this part of the 
operation the army put U.S. regional interests at risk.   Although the post-conflict plan 
was largely ineffective in Panama, the political, economic, and social factors did not 
precipitate a descent into total lawlessness or anarchy as in Iraq more than a decade later.  
However, the potential for such an eventuality was present, and without a clear plan to 
‘win the peace,’ the U.S. army left itself susceptible to further conflict. 
Special Interests  
As a large-scale military operation, Just Cause included nearly every type of 
army unit, ranging from elite light infantry to assault helicopters and tanks. Many 
officers interpreted Just Cause through the lens of their specific branch or military 
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occupational specialty or focused on one type of weapon.  This was particularly true of 
officers who were concerned that the end of the Cold War would see a rapid decline in 
the importance of armor and aviation.   
 In Panama the army deployed the M-551A1 Sheridan, a tank that originally 
entered service in the late 1960s.  The Sheridan was a light tank, weighing in at just over 
15 tons, which allowed it to be air-dropped in support of airborne operations.  The 
somewhat unique capability of the Sheridan endeared it to several officers. Major 
Burdett Thompson concluded that the Sheridan’s unique strategic capability made it 
critical to the army’s forced entry ability.  Her conclusion put her at odds with the 
army’s plan to phase out the Sheridan in 1996 without providing a replacement.49  She 
advocated retaining and improving the army’s light armor vehicles.50 Major Michael J. 
Kazmierski’s contended: 
There are two key points to be learned from this operation.  First, the 
firepower and mobility of the mechanized forces contributed significantly 
to the overall success of the operation. A mechanized infantry battalion, a 
light armored vehicle company of Marines and a company of M-551A1 
Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles greatly assisted in delivering 
the impact of overwhelming U.S. combat power. The sight and sound of a 
tracked vehicle is unmistakable to a light infantry soldier, armed only 
with a rifle, and can provide the impact needed to encourage the surrender 
of these lightly armed enemy troops, avoiding the need for costly 
fighting.51   
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Kazmierski concluded that Panama demonstrated the eternal truth that mechanized 
forces alone could provide the “firepower, mobility, and survivability needed to support 
the difficult house-to-house fighting.”52  Major Marshall Hagen concurred with 
Kazmierski’s view that armored vehicles gave commanders an edge in Panama due to 
their “immediate mobility, shock action and firepower at the decisive point in the 
operation” and because “light armor was important in a show of force role because it 
discouraged sniping, looting, and general civil unrest.”53  Major Scott Hume concluded 
that Panamanian operations proved the 75th Ranger Regiment required a combat system 
to provide “overwhelming firepower against enemy weapons; a rapid maneuver 
capability to the ground force commander; a sensor package that can leverage 
information to enhance leadership through faster and more accurate decision making 
capabilities than the enemy; and protection for the crew. One type of system that can 
provide these elements of combat power to the ground force is an armored vehicle.” 54 
Those who argued that Just Cause proved the continuing relevance of armor 
failed to consider two important points.  One was that the PDF did not have the 
capability to fight an armored force effectively.  This allowed the American forces to 
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operate without fear of losing armored vehicles and act in a manner they would not be 
able to in a less permissive environment.  A second was that officers did not include the 
logistical requirements of operating armored forces in their analysis.  In Panama the U.S. 
had the benefit of being close to strategic bases and even had permanent military 
infrastructure in Panama.  In a more remote or austere location the logistical burden of 
armored forces could be very challenging. 
  Another Cold War weapons system that appeared to demonstrate its continued 
importance was the helicopter.  Major Bradley Mason made this point emphatically:     
The successful aviation operations during "Just Cause" were due in large 
part to preparation and readiness. The specialized training programs 
highlighted in the previous paragraph [that focused on the transition from 
combat to post-conflict operations] and the emphasis by commanders on 
rules of engagement and conducting realistic rehearsals paid off. The 
assault helicopter units employed in Panama had trained to conduct LIC 
operations for both peace and war. They operated on "the fine line" for 
almost two years before engaging in actual hostilities, and their 
experiences could provide a meaningful foundation for assault helicopter 
LIC doctrine.55 
 
Although Mason praised the training, preparation, and execution of the invasion, he 
concluded that current doctrine was “inadequate to provide a salient training focus and 
must evolve to meet the challenges, dangers, and uncertainties, of operating in low 
intensity conflict.”56 
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 Major John Hansen was particularly interested in the firepower of attack 
helicopters – a characteristic that was limited by collateral damage concerns in Panama: 
Sometimes the tolerance curve is very shallow and collateral damage 
becomes an overriding concern. During the raid into Tinajitas, Panama, 
Operation JUST CAUSE, preparatory fires into the landing zone were 
ruled out because of the populated neighborhoods surrounding Tinajitas. 
Normally the first stage in an air assault is the preparation of the target 
with fires from attack helicopters, artillery or fixed wing aircraft to 
suppress enemy defenses. [General James Johnson said]  "We put our 
soldiers at risk in order to minimize casualties and damage to the 
Panamanian people and their country.”57   
 
Despite the limitations on the use of force, he argued that “Forces require protection as 
the threat of open aggression against OOTW operations increases. The simple presence 
of an attack helicopter is documented as to being enough to provide protection to ground 
forces.”58  Hansen concluded that the mobility, agility, firepower, and the psychological 
effect on combatants combined to give attack helicopters “a unique role in operations 
other than war.”59 
Conclusion 
 Operation Just Cause is and was widely regarded as a successful military 
operation.  On this point, there is little to argue.  U.S. forces were able to achieve all 
major military objectives quickly, and cheaply (in both terms of lives and resources) – 
and this is precisely the narrative that nearly all general officers offer in their analysis of 
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the conflict.  Some generals (such as Stiner and Vuono) even went so far as to suggest 
that there were no true lessons learned, but merely validation of principles and 
imperatives learned elsewhere.  Yet there is debate concerning the classification of Just 
Cause as a decisive American victory.  The U.S. invasion of Panama killed civilians, 
destroyed infrastructure, and toppled a government (which it had supported for decades) 
with virtually no plan to restore stability and normalcy following the conflict – putting 
American interests in the region in peril.  These facts led some mid-level officers to 
conclude that army’s training, doctrine, and execution of post-conflict operations was 
inadequate (or in some cases nonexistent).  While these officers also saw Panama as a 
victory, there viewed the invasion as a real-world test that challenged the army in 
unexpected ways. 
 The divergence in perspective between these groups illustrates a few things.  
First, senior leaders looked to Panama to vindicate their efforts spent improving the 
army since the Vietnam War.  The army that invaded Panama in 1989 was a vastly 
different one than departed Vietnam 15 years before – it was even a different army than 
had invaded Grenada merely six years before.  These officers needed Panama to be a 
success so they could consider their careers and their views of the army and its role in 
combat as successful.  Secondly, the different perspectives indicate differing attitudes 
towards lesson learning. Stiner, Vuono, and other general officers often conflated lesson 
learning with mistakes while field-grade officers could be critical of an operation even if 
it went well.  
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 We can also learn from the areas in which these officers’ perspectives converged.  
The vast majority of officers interpreted Just Cause narrowly and focused their analysis 
on tactics, organizations, equipment, and other detailed aspects of the operation.  While 
some officers – such as Applegate and Baggot – attempted to draw larger conclusions 
about the army and its role in war, their efforts failed to gain traction with military and 
civilian leaders.  The result was an army that learned superficial lessons from Just 
Cause, many of which it had learned elsewhere and merely reinforced in Panama.  By 
sticking to their relative comfort zones, the officers that experienced and interpreted Just 
Cause missed an opportunity for growth.  Instead of analyzing the army’s relative 
strengths and weaknesses and adapting, the army maintained the status quo after 
Panama.  In this case, this was not a general problem or a field officer problem, it was an 
officer problem.   
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CHAPTER III 
DEALING WITH DEFEAT: THE US ARMY IN SOMALIA  
 
 The early 1990s was, on the surface, a time for the US Army to celebrate.  The 
rapid and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the US as the sole 
remaining superpower and without an obvious adversary with which to contend.  In 
addition to the geo-political developments, army operations in the first years of the 
decade seemed to indicate that the army rediscovered the formula for success.  First, in 
Panama, Operation Just Cause could be viewed as an overwhelming military victory 
that achieved its limited objectives in spectacular fashion – and perhaps most 
importantly did not entangle the US in a protracted struggle.  The Persian Gulf War, less 
than a year after Just Cause, was cause for even greater celebration.  To many officers 
and military analysts, the decisive U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War was a vindication 
of the American way of war.  The ease with which US and Coalition forces swept their 
Iraqi opponents from the battlefield was astonishing, especially given the perceived 
strength and expertise of the Iraqi Army. 
 The short-lived era of triumphalism ended abruptly in October 1993 when 
eighteen Americans were killed and a further seventy-three were wounded in the Battle 
of Mogadishu against Somali warlords and militiamen.  Although labeled as a tactical 
victory, the battle was a strategic loss that eroded the American people’s will to continue 
and eventually led to U.S. withdrawal in March 1994.  The stinging defeat in Somali 
caused many questions to emerge over the U.S. Army’s ability to fight and win in a post-
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Cold World against post-Cold War adversaries.  By extension, it caused many officers to 
question the direction of the army and the future of military conflict in the waning years 
of the 21st Century.      
Paved with Good Intentions – The Road to U.S. Intervention in Somalia 
 The political, social, and economic factors which spurred American and United 
Nations intervention did not coalesce overnight.  Instead, these issues can be traced back 
to the disastrous Ogaden War of 1977-1978 in which Somali forces attempted to seize 
Ethiopian lands that were part of “Greater Somalia.”  Instead of expanding his power, 
the President of Somalia – Mohamed Siad Barre – damaged the Somali Army and 
undermined his domestic credibility and political power.60 
The failed war had two lasting impacts.  The first was that seeds of dissent were 
sewn amongst the Somali tribes.  In the immediate aftermath of the war members of the 
Majeerateen Clan attempted an unsuccessful coup d'état which the Barre government 
defeated.  The government’s crackdown enflamed other tribal conflicts and contributed 
to the small but steadily growing anti-government resistance, which eventually fomented 
into open rebellion in the 1980s.  The second legacy of the Ogaden War was the 
movement of Somalia into the American sphere of influence in the Cold War.  In the 
initial phases of the war both the Ethiopian and Somali governments were Socialist and 
firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence.  The Soviets were caught in an awkward 
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situation supplying both sides of the conflict with military support.  Eventually Soviet 
leaders withdrew their support of the Somalis, pushing them towards the Americans.  
The U.S., seeking to undermine Soviet interests and advance their own, supplied and 
supported the Somalis in exchange for military access on the strategic Horn of Africa.  
From that time forward, American interests in the region were linked with Somalia.61 
Barre’s problems continued throughout the 1980s as tribal tensions boiled over 
and manifested in a low-grade insurgency.  The Somali National Army’s attempts to 
crush the tribal rebellions were unsuccessful and spurred further rebellion.  In early 1990 
Barre’s position was extremely precarious.  The United Somali Congress controlled 
most of Somalia, leaving Mogadishu as the last vestige of Barre’s power.  After a 
prolonged fight in the city Barre was deposed and exiled.  Instead of bringing peace and 
stability, the Somali Congress quickly disintegrated into several groups each vying for 
control of the government and limited natural resources – including food.62 
The war, the austere Somali environment, drought, and rampant corruption 
combined to create widespread famine By 1992 an estimated 300,000 Somalis died of 
malnutrition, 3 million refugees had fled the country, and a further 10% of the 
population was at risk of malnutrition.63  Facing a humanitarian crisis of epic 
proportions, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions to implement a ceasefire 
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and render humanitarian aid.  The first UN peacekeepers arrived as part of the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in July 1992 to “monitor the ceasefire in 
Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres.”64  
Almost immediately the UN operation proved to be ineffective.  Somali factions largely 
ignored the ceasefire when it suited them and routinely seized, destroyed, or otherwise 
harassed humanitarian assistance when it did not directly support their own interests.  In 
late 1992 it was clear to American and UN officials a larger peacekeeping force would 
be required and in November 1992 the U.S. proposal to lead a multi-national security 
force to render humanitarian aid was accepted.   
The new UN operation, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the UN 
and Operation Restore Hope to the U.S., was launched in December of 1992.  At peak 
strength, UNITAF numbered roughly 38,000 troops representing 23 different 
countries.65  The increased UN presence had a chilling effect on the Somali factions and 
reduced the violence to a level that facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid.  As 
the humanitarian crisis faded, U.S. leaders desired to reduce the number of American 
forces in Somalia which prompted the UN to establish UNOSOM II.  The new UN 
mission expanded the scope of previous missions and UNOSOM II was “to take 
appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a 
secure environment for humanitarian assistance.” To that end, UNOSOM II was to 
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complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task 
Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order.66 
Identifying the change in forces and missions, the previously pacified Somali 
warlords ceased their cooperation and openly engaged UN forces throughout 
Mogadishu.  On 5 June 1993, Somali militiamen attacked Pakistani forces assigned to 
UNOSOM II, killing twenty-four and wounding an additional forty-four.  The attack on 
5 June triggered an escalation of violence in Mogadishu.  U.S. and UN forces conducted 
offensive raids, striking at warlords’ positions throughout Mogadishu, who in turn, 
counterattacked throughout the city.  Hoping to deescalate the situation, allied  leaders 
focused their efforts on one of the strongest warlords, Mohammed Farrah Aidid.  To aid 
in their efforts to remove Aidid, the U.S. deployed a Joint Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) named Task Force Ranger (TF Ranger) comprised of Rangers Regiment 
soldiers and elements of Delta Force.67   
Beginning in late August, TF Ranger conducted a series of raids against Aidid 
and his top lieutenants.  Initially TF Ranger enjoyed success and captured several key 
leaders of Aidid’s organization and severely limited his ability to move in and around 
Mogadishu.  Instead of weakening the resistance and reducing violence, the American 
actions triggered stauncher Somali resistance.  Although under constant pressure, Aidid 
and others were emboldened by their successes against U.S. and UN targets.  On 25 
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September 1993 Aidid’s militia destroyed an American helicopter with Rocket Propelled 
Grenades (RPG), killing three American soldiers.  Days later, on the afternoon of 3 
October 1993, TF Ranger launched the raid which would eventually be immortalized by 
the book and film Black Hawk Down.  The ensuing engagement, known as the Battle of 
Mogadishu, was the fiercest fighting of the campaign and lasted through the evening of 3 
October into the morning of 4 October.  Somali militia shot down two American 
helicopters, destroyed numerous vehicles, and pinned down a company of TF Ranger for 
an extended period.  When the battle ceased, sixteen American Soldiers were dead, fifty-
seven wounded, and one captured.68  Although the battle was insignificant in terms of 
the overall military strength of TF Ranger, the strategic consequences were immense.  In 
the matter of an afternoon, American policy changed as the U.S. mission in Somalia lost  
both political and public support.  In the closing months of 1993 and beginning months 
of 1994, American forces set conditions for their withdrawal which was completed on 25 
March 1994. 
 The American mission in Somalia, born of noble ideals and impulses, died an 
inglorious death at the hands of Somali warlords less than a year after it had begun.  The 
events of 3 and 4 October shocked the U.S. military and by extension, the U.S. Army 
which to this point, was still enjoying the prestige of its success in Panama and Desert 
Storm.  The strategic defeat caused many professional military officers to examine the 
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army’s performance, questions its trajectory, and contemplate the army’s role in post-
Cold War national security.   
The initial step in that examination was a series of formal and informal inquires 
and reports.  One of the most influential of these reports was from Colonel Kenneth 
Allard.  Among the many lessons learned compiled by Allard, were four overarching 
lessons.  The first, Allard claimed, was that nation building was “a mission for which our 
forces should not be primarily responsible” and that civilian agencies of the government 
[were] better able to specialize in such long-term humanitarian efforts.”69  The second 
lesson was that “any action in a peace operation that effectively takes sides between 
factions engaged in internal civil strife” would be viewed as hostile, in which “there 
should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed 
to combat.”70  Thirdly, Allard believed that “the three chains of command running 
during UNOSOM II underline[d] the importance of a lesson that should be adapted from 
Murphy's Laws of Combat: If it takes more than 10 seconds to explain the command 
arrangements, they probably won’t work.”71  Lastly, he concluded that Somalia was “a 
clear warning for the future: Beware of the temptation to do too much. Giving in to that 
temptation is an occupational hazard in an institution built around can-do attitudes and 
the expectation of success. All the more reason, then, to ensure that the analysis of any 
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peace operation includes the selection of those indicators that can best measure mission 
accomplishment.”72 For all intents and purposes, Allard’s work served as the official 
lessons learned by the army.  While many of his views were shared by his 
contemporaries, other officers had different interpretations of the army’s actions in 
Somalia.  What follows is an examination of their interpretations of the lessons learned 
in Somalia and the legacy of the U.S. intervention in Somalia on future military 
operations.  
The General Officer Perspective 
 The U.S. Army experience in Somalia was a polarizing one for general officers.  
As leaders, they were ultimately responsible for the army and its ability to successfully 
complete its assigned missions. Failure, then, was a rebuke of their expertise, leadership, 
and the overall direction of the army.  Unsurprisingly, this did not sit well with some 
general officers and many of them struggled to come to terms with the army’s 
experience and the conflict’s impact on future operations. 
Intervention, Humanitarian Aid, and MOOTWs 
 At the heart of the generals’ analysis of the U.S. involvement in Somalia was a 
question with profound impacts: when was a military intervention appropriate?   This 
question encompassed ongoing debates within the 1990’s army such as the importance 
of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), the army’s role in nation building, 
and stability operations.  How these generals answered this question exposed a rift 
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between some of even the most senior military leaders.  General Colin Powell, and other 
adherents to the Powell doctrine, seemed to be preoccupied with avoiding a repeat of the 
Vietnam war at all costs. Other officers, such as Gordon R. Sullivan, George A. 
Joulwan, and William F. Kernan believed the army would and should be used abroad 
early and often to manipulate regional social, political, and economic conditions to avoid 
costly wars and prolonged entanglement. 
 Powell, serving his last days as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made his 
dissatisfaction with the U.S. presence in Somalia clear.  He later claimed that even 
before the Battle of Mogadishu he had “been urging [Defense Secretary] Aspin for 
weeks to demand a policy review to find a way out [of Somalia].”73 Powell’s outlook on 
intervention was manifested in the “doctrine” attributed to him.  An outgrowth of the 
Vietnam War, the Powell Doctrine argued that American forces should only be 
committed after certain conditions were met: “A risk to national security; . . . positive 
international support; clearly defined political objectives; full consideration of risk to US 
troops and their length of stay; a well-defined exit strategy; and clear approval from the 
American people.”74  Powell argued that American entry into Somalia violated these 
principles in two important ways.  The first was the U.S. and UN plans did not have a 
clear exit strategy: 
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The UN approved a resolution shifting the mission from feeding the 
hungry to “nation building,” the phrase I first heard when we went into 
Vietnam.  From what I have observed of history, the will to build a nation 
comes from within its people, not from outside. . . .  Nation building 
might have an inspirational ring, but it struck me as a way to get bogged 
down in Somalia, not get out.75 
 
Secondly, the action in Somalia violated Powell’s principle that military interventions 
must have popular support.  In his view, the Somalia mission “understandably confused 
Americans.  Why, since we had gone into Somalia to feed its starving people, were our 
troops being shot at?  This was the quicksand that the UN “nation-building” mission had 
sucked us into.”76  As we saw earlier in Panama, Powell’s interpretation of Somalia was 
heavily influenced by his experience and understanding of the Vietnam War.  His pre-
existing viewpoints on war and the use of force colored his analysis of Somalia and led 
him to the conclusion that Somalia was a mistake and served to prove the lessons he had 
learned elsewhere.  
 In contrast to Powell, General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army 
from 1991-1995, declared “I was and am a conflict prevention and a post conflict 
reconstruction guy.  Peacetime engagement, being involved with our allies, being 
involved in winning the peace, are important concepts.”77  In such situations he 
advocated a whole-government approach: “we have to play our role and the rest of the 
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Federal Government has to play its role, the Department of Agriculture, the Department 
of Energy.  Peacetime engagement, shaping--I happened to be a proponent of shaping.”78     
Rather than viewing the intervention in Somalia as merely a small tactical failure 
soon to be forgotten, Sullivan was concerned with the secondary and tertiary effects of 
America failure and worried “that we have left Somalia and we left a petri dish open. 
There have been bugs crawling in that petri dish since we left and they are not good 
bugs.  There was no post-conflict reconstruction.  I understand that some people view 
that as nation building, which to some, has become a very derogative term.”79 Despite 
the tactical setbacks and the loss of life, Sullivan ultimately concluded that reestablishing 
the “sinews of civil society” was critical to success in low intensity conflicts and the 
army’s true failure was not following though and eliminating the root causes of 
instability in the region.80 
 Whether military interventions were in the best interest of the United States or 
not, the 1990s was an active decade, and seemed to some, to be an indicator of future 
military action.  General George Joulwan, Commander of U.S. Southern Command and 
later European Command, believed that MOOTWs and other stability operations “are 
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not going to go away. The military and the Army need to understand.”81  Although clear 
to him, Joulwan believed other officers didn’t share his conclusion which “said 
something about our military that so much of our leadership was against doing these 
missions [MOOTWs]. They really didn’t want to do them.”  Joulwan alleged that the 
failures in Somalia could be traced backed to the inability or unwillingness of army 
leaders to embrace and adapt to stability operations, causing them to be “caught short in 
Somalia.”82  Joulwan concluded: 
I wish we had gone through that transformation back then [in the early 
1990s].  But it was very difficult because many felt that we shouldn’t do 
those types of things.  So what happened was the National Command 
Authority would finally say to the military, “Do something.”  And we 
didn’t really know how to do it.  In many cases we got not only people 
killed, but also we did not do it in a professional way.83 
General William Kernan, Commander in Chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
believed the failed operation inspired a reappraisal of army strategic assumptions. 
Based on our Somalia experience, we started looking at big questions 
about big things.  We started looking at things like energy; the inability to 
provide energy and power and our reliance on it.  We started asking 
questions like, “What are the second and third order effects on a 
population, on an economy and on an expectation of a populace based on 
the ability – or inability – of a government to provide services; run 
hospitals; to have lights in homes; refrigeration; and those kinds of 
questions.  The inability of a government to provide and sustain those 
kinds of services can cause a great deal of disillusionment on the part of 
the people with and loss of confidence in their government.  All of that 
plays on other people’s ability to question the effectiveness of the 
government.   We were always looking for those “chinks in the armor;” 
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for the seams and gaps in national resilience.84 
 
Like Sullivan, Kernan advocated for a whole-government approach to stability 
operations which seemed to look very similar to counterinsurgency and nation building 
in the latter stages of American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These striking 
similarities force us to consider how many of these lessons were actually learned in 
Somalia, rather than General Kernan re-examining his view of Somalia through a post-
2007 Iraqi-occupation tinted lens.   
 Through much of the 1990s, army leadership struggled to come to grips over the 
army’s role in nation building, low-intensity conflicts, and MOOTWs in general.  Powell 
sought to limit the army’s exposure to protracted conflicts against enemies that couldn’t 
be decisively or quickly defeated.  To Powell, Somalia was proof that the army had no 
business building nations.  Yet other generals examined the same evidence and reached 
different conclusions.  Sullivan saw Somalia as a failure but not one that ruled our 
further interventions.  Joulwan and Kernan believed that Somalia-like operations would 
play an important role in the army’s future and ultimately concluded that the army 
needed to learn and adapt from its experiences in Africa.  Despite all of the lessons 
learned by these and other officers, precious little seemed to make a lasting change in the 
wider army.  Regardless of these officers’ emphasis on reestablishing the “sinews of 
civil society,” nation building, and the effectiveness of host nation governments during 
post-conflict operations, the army would blunder through the same problems a decade 
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later in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Why Did We Lose and What Can We Do About it? 
General Dennis Reimer, Commanding General of Forces Command 
(FORSCOM) from April 1993 to June of 1995, was intimately aware and concerned 
with the army’s performance in Somalia.  Shortly after the Battle of Mogadishu Reimer 
visited Somalia to determine the cause of defeat, which he primarily attributed to 
ineffective command and control relationships between U.S. and UN forces.85  Reimer 
also identified tactical deficiencies:  
The special operating force had gotten somewhat complacent in terms of 
what they were trying to do, and this had led to some casualties that we 
should never have taken.  My review of the situation just reinforced that 
when you start taking shortcuts and violate the principals of war you get 
in big trouble.  I also felt that our elite forces should not be used for 
operations such as this that become rather routine over time -- we train 
them hard and we need to make sure they keep that razor edge that the 
training provides.86     
 
Reimer argued these problems were compounded by decisions made at the very highest 
levels of civilian leadership, most notably “the command had asked for additional 
equipment, to include tanks [and AC1-30 gunships], and had been turned down at the 
Sec Def (Sec Aspin) level.”87  Reimer’s accusation was controversial – and false.  His 
account ignored the role senior military leaders played in denying the requests for 
additional forces.  General Joseph P. Hoar testified before Congress that “The AC-130s 
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were dropped [from Task Force Ranger] in view of the number of capabilities available 
to the task force.  That was my recommendation up the line. . . . There was a three-way 
discussion among [U.S. Special Operations Command Commander General Wayne A.] 
Downing, Powell and me about the deployment of little birds, troop carriers, etc.  I felt 
and Downing agreed (he certainly told me he did) that we didn’t need AC-130s or an 
extra platoon.”88  As a result of Hoar’s testimony, Reimer’s claims must be interpreted in 
one of two ways.  Either Reimer lacked the information required to arrive at an accurate 
conclusion (unlikely given his position and timing of his comments) or he was deflecting 
blame onto civilian leadership to protect military leaders.   
Somalia affected Reimer’s outlook on future conflict in two notable ways.  The 
first was that he believed Somalia was an indicator of trends in future conflicts:  away 
from conventional conflict towards irregular or asymmetrical warfare.  He concluded 
that from now on “we were going to face different types of missions and, in fact, we 
were already starting to face different types of missions on a more regular basis.”  He 
also held that Americans now had a “zero causality mentality” that adversely affected 
the army’s ability to accomplish its missions.  But to what extent did the nation’s 
mentality affect the army?  Was it a small obstacle to be overcome or unassailable?  
Reimer’s answer to this question varied on the situation.  In Somalia, he did not attribute 
the mission’s failure primarily to casualty aversion, but recognized it as one of many 
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considerations.  In other places, like Haiti, he believed military’s fear of casualties 
prevented the army from even beginning its mission.89   
Like Reimer, General Gordon Sullivan attributed the failure in Somalia primarily 
to the lack of unity of command.90  He also placed blame on the disjointed efforts of the 
military, governmental agencies, and non-governmental agencies which he believed 
must be “closely linked” and that “must be in the game 24 hours a day, 7 days a week” 
to ensure success in peacekeeping operations.91  Achieving unity of command and unity 
of effort within the military is a difficult task in and of itself, adding interagency partners 
to an operation adds another degree of difficulty – and in Sullivan’s view was an area 
that required additional attention following Somalia: “training with nongovernmental 
organizations, private volunteer organizations, primarily down at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC, Fort Polk, Louisiana) and we did a lot of that after Somalia in 
1993. . .”92 
General Joulwan’s analysis of Somalia identified what he believed was a key 
component to the army’s failure: 
If you [army leaders] don’t anticipate, if you don’t try to give this clear 
advice [to political leaders] in today’s environment, you then are forced 
to be reactive instead of proactive and you put the mission and the troops 
at risk. Our troops may have the best equipment and the best technology, 
but if they are not well trained, if they are not focused, and if they don’t 
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understand the mission, we may very well fail.  If it’s a knee-jerk sort of 
reaction, then I think you are not looking out for their welfare and you 
may end up as we did in Somalia – with a disaster.93 
Joulwan argued an important point, that senior military leaders were not providing their 
subordinates with sufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute their orders.   
 Reimer, Sullivan, Joulwan, and others identified mistakes at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of war that called into question the direction of the army 
and effectiveness of the army’s early 1990s transformation.  Perhaps most worryingly, 
the problems these officers’ identified were not novel problems, but comparatively well-
known problems that surfaced in Grenada and Panama in the previous decade.  Despite 
the lessons seemingly learned by the general officers in Somalia, the army did not appear 
to act upon them, and committed many of the same mistakes in the Balkans, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan a decade later.   
The Field-Grade Officer Perspective 
 While general officers were relatively restrained in their critiques of U.S. 
involvement in Somalia for a variety of reasons (such as personal relationships with 
decision makers, political concerns, and prospect for their future advancement), field 
grade officers did not operate under the same restraints.  Although members of the same 
profession their relative lack of rank and prestige granted them a degree of anonymity 
which was useful in critiquing the army’s performance.  Despite witnessing or studying 
the same events, these authors reached different conclusions about the legacy of 
Somalia. 
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Mission Creep, Ambiguous Missions, and Failure 
 One of the primary lessons that field officers learned from Somalia was the 
danger of mission creep. Major Daniel Schuster defined mission creep as the process by 
which “over time the initial reason for military involvement in a particular operation 
undergoes expansive permutations as additional opportunities for a positive military 
influence in a diplomatic issue are perceived.”94  Major Melissa Applegate described it 
as “an ‘evolving end state,’ which broadened the scope of the operation to include many 
missions and tasks that were never initially conceived as part of the operation.”95  With 
either definition in mind, the potential danger of mission creep seemed obvious.  Yet 
others argued that it “was not clear . . . whether mission creep was a phenomenon 
inherent in a dynamic situation, and thus something that commanders and their staffs 
needed to anticipate and adjust to, or whether it was an insidious process.”96  Schuster 
believed that the “danger of mission creep lies in relating tasks to purpose. New tasks 
that creep into the military mission may be contrary to the initial purpose.”97 Schuster 
raised a profound point – that ever-expanding military missions have the potential to 
evolve in scope and size contrary to the will of leaders.  In Somalia, Applegate observed 
a runaway military mission: 
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The frictions inherent in tactical actions, however, soon broached a 
strategic crisis. The U.S. efforts to arrest Aidid resulted in six successive 
highly publicized failures which became increasingly indiscriminate in 
inflicting civilian casualties. If the tactical watchwords for peace 
enforcement are decisive and discriminate, at some point continuance of 
these raids became counterproductive to the strategic aim. Each failure to 
arrest Aidid bolstered his prestige and undermined that of the U.S. 
deployed forces. Each failure also marked a growing operational 
separation between the tactics employed and the strategic aim.98 
Major Todd Wood’s 1997 SAMS monograph which studied Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) concluded “Mission analysis is difficult without a 
clear mission, commander's intent, and end state.  With changing missions that cover 
such a broad context, it becomes almost impossible to conduct effective IPB whether 
using doctrine or TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures].”99 Wood argued that the 
domino-like relationship between mission creep, staff functions, and tactical unit failure 
was evident before soldiers arrived in Somalia:      
The mission creep they [the 10th Mountain Division] experienced directly 
correlates with the IPB and mission planning prior to deployment. The 
insufficient IPB was due to two factors, the lack of strategic IPB, which 
provides basic planning information, and a compressed planning 
sequence. The unit was originally allotted 10 days to plan for the mission 
but that time was reduced to 4 days.100 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 11-12. 
 
99 Todd Wood, “Can IPB Eliminate Mission Creep?” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
1997), 21.  
 
100 Ibid., 23-24.  For more on the army’s struggle to adapt conventional IPB to MOOTWs and other 
stability operations see Bruce Guggenberger, “Intelligence Requirements for Operations Other Than War,” 
(master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000); William Mangan, “Army IPB in 
Support of Nation Building Operations,” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005); 
Steven Rotkoff, “Intelligence Training for Stability and Support Operations – Can the Military Intelligence 
Officers Advance Course Do Better?” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999); Lauri 
Snider, “Assessment of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance 
Operations,” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996).   
 
 57 
 
He contended that the reduced planning process adversely effected commanders’ 
awareness of the battlefield, which in turn adversely effected their units’ ability to 
accomplish their missions.  He described a cascading series of problems in Somalia:  
The problem with IPB began with the description of the battlefield. The 
AO (area of operation) and AI (area of interest) were not properly 
addressed. No historical data was available on the patterns of the warring 
faction, and their equipment was not known This caused the commander 
to have an unclear picture of the enemy situation. . . . The IPB failed to 
identify humanitarian relief and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
already operating in the country.  This resulted in confusion as to what 
the NGOs capabilities were and where they had been operating.  The lack 
of information about the warring clans, terrain, and NGOs combined to 
give the deploying commander a hazy picture of the AO. This in turn 
affected both the selection of forces deployed, and the order in which they 
arrived.101 
Writing in 1995, Major Michael Beech reached similar conclusions when he 
studied operational and strategic level decision making in Somalia.   Just as Wood and 
Schuster had found at the tactical level in their studies, Beech found that “that 
contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor 
operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational 
level which contributed to the failed U.S. intervention. Military operations were not 
connected to the rapidly shifting political aims.”102  Beech railed against inadequate 
guidance from senior leadership: 
UN resolutions are not an acceptable replacement for clear policy aims 
and a sufficient operational plan. Without such a clear policy there can be 
no concrete operational objectives or measurable end states.  The US 
experience in Somalia shows that a lack of clear policy focus produces a 
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lack of operational focus increasing the risk of mission creep.103 
 
Beech also argued that senior commanders abrogated “the responsibility of establishing 
clear and achievable objectives even in environment of strategic ambiguity.”104  Beech 
concluded: 
Operational level commanders must define clear end states that when 
executed achieve the intended political objectives. They must also 
consider the possibility of tactical failures and the subsequent results on 
national policy. If the national policy is so fragile that it cannot survive a 
tactical disaster then either the military means or the policy are severely 
flawed and requires re-examination.105 
As a result of the army’s rapidly evolving missions in Somalia, units were 
required to evolve in order to be successful, something many units found to be difficult 
to accomplish.  Major Mark Duffield’s 1999 SAMS monograph studied the adaption 
models of the army and the Somali Habr Gidr Clan.  Duffield sought to answer a vexing 
question – how did a seemingly “anarchic mob” function as a “complex and adaptive 
system” and evolve faster than the U.S. Army?106  He concluded that “the U.S., reliant 
on rational analysis and apparently oblivious to other possible adaptation models, 
underestimated the Habr Gidr who adapted through both deliberate rational analysis 
and. . . . complex adaptive system theory.”107  The Somalis were seemingly able to out-
                                                 
103 Ibid., 43.   
 
104 Ibid.  
 
105 Ibid., 44.   
 
106 Mark Duffield, “Into the Beehive – The Somali Habr Gidr Clan as an Adaptive Enemy” (monograph, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999), i.  
 
107 Ibid., 42. 
 59 
 
learn and out-adapt the army.  The implications of the army’s inability to learn and 
change were ominous, since Duffield believed that the service’s future missions would 
include more “peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance.”108   
The Problems with Peacekeeping 
As Duffield indicated, another field grade officer critique of Somalia was that 
that the army’s ability to accomplish peacekeeping missions was inadequate.  These 
officers learned that the complex interplay between army doctrine, military training, 
leadership, and foreign policy resulted in an army that had difficulty conducting 
peacekeeping operations.  In turn, these officers offered a variety of solutions and 
recommendations to combat the army’s ineffectiveness ranging from avoidance to 
paradigm shifts and everything in between. 
 Major Robert Botters’ SAMS monograph examined “the scope and complexity 
of peace operations” and the effect of those operations on tactical units within the army.  
Specifically, this officer was interested in determining if units’ involvement in 
MOOTWs degraded their ability to fight conventional war.   Somewhat surprisingly, he 
viewed the army’s experience in Somalia as a positive example of a unit organized and 
trained for war rapidly transitioning “between both peace operations and combat 
operations in the same environment.”109  He concluded: “The U.S. Army should avoid 
non-traditional organizations for peace operations and remain focused on preparing units 
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for combat operations.”110  Botters’ message was clear, prepare for war and adapt to 
peace operations.  His findings were heavily influenced by the focus of his limited study.  
He was only interested in the tactical proficiency of the units involved in the Battle of 
Mogadishu and ignored the strategic outcome of the conflict.  His limited examination of 
the conflict illustrates two things: 1) some officers believed (either consciously or not) 
that outcomes were not directly correlated with performance and 2) tactical outcomes 
were worthy of consideration even after strategic failures.   
In his 1997 Command and General Staff College thesis, Major Robert Young 
examined how participation in MOOTWs had affected officers’ opinions on the 
adequacy of their units’ training and preparation and their “propensity toward using 
lethal force in the future.”  He found that of the officers surveyed, 65% percent desired 
the army to conduct less MOOTWs in the future, 19% assessed that their units were not 
appropriate for the missions they were assigned, and 90% reported no change in their 
future propensity to use lethal force in the future.”111  Young’s survey, although narrow 
in scope and of limited utility in predicting the attitudes of army officers on a broader 
scale, identified several areas of concern for field officers.  He found that the “warrior 
ethos may be jeopardized or compromised by OOTW. Over one-third of the officers in 
this study thought that being part of a peacekeeping force was not the kind of job his 
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soldier should be doing.”112  In addition to being counter to the army’s culture, Young 
observed that “most participants believe their unit was less combat ready after the 
OOTW deployment.”113  Young concluded that the army’s lack of clear prioritization of 
combat and MOOTWs compounded its units’ readiness.  This officer’s work highlighted 
an instance of organizational and cultural dissonance within the army: officers 
recognized the increased likelihood that the army would conduct MOOTWs yet resisted 
the changes that would enable their completion.   
Major Michael Clidas’ 1995 SAMS monograph examined the role of impartiality 
in peacekeeping operations.  He theorized that impartiality was a “’hub of power’ for the 
peace support force” that when compromised, often led to “protracted conflict and 
eventual failure.”114  In Somalia Clidas saw “a combination of flawed policy, coupled 
with a shortsighted application of force” that was “directly attributable to the PSF’s 
[Peacekeeping Force] loss of impartiality.115    
 Applegate’s 1994 master’s thesis argued “during protracted intervention, the U.S. 
reaches a strategic point of diminishing returns where the costs begin to surpass the 
strategic gains to be made. . . . [and] failure to recognize this point can significantly 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 113 
 
113 Ibid. 
 
114 Ibid., 1. 
 
115 Ibid., 29-30. 
 62 
 
affect goal attainment, and protracted intervention can negatively affect readiness.”116  
Her interpretation of Somalia supported that point: 
The specific strategic objectives which were stated at the onset of the 
intervention were attained and the mission turned back over to the United 
Nations (UNOSOM- II) organization to realize the long-term objective of 
reconstituting the government and infrastructure--in other words, of 
promoting stability and encouraging democratic development. However, 
it only took one Somalia clan faction to begin to chafe at the amount of 
control imposed to lead to highly publicized dissent. This dissent led to 
opposition and then to violence, requiring an increased presence of U.S. 
and coalition forces and, in turn, increased imposition of control. . . . The 
failure to recognize the point of strategic diminishing returns led to 
confusion within the administration, the national military command, the 
diplomatic community and finally, among commanders on the ground.117 
Major Roger Sangvic’s 1998 case study of what he termed the “catastrophic 
failure” of the Battle of Mogadishu  found poor decision-making on several levels of 
command, ranging from tactical commanders to army generals to the Secretary of 
Defense.118    His main criticism, however, was at the tactical level.  Prior to the Battle of 
Mogadishu, TF Ranger had conducted several successful raids and met negligible 
resistance, leading to a sense of superiority.  Sangvic argued that the “combination of 
underestimating the enemy’s capabilities and their own [TF Ranger’s] vulnerabilities as 
a result of overconfidence led to planning that could only deal with the best case 
scenario.”119  Sangvic concluded: 
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TFR’s [Task Force Ranger’s] failure to adapt was caused by a planning 
failure. A key part of the planning process is the wargaming process 
where friendly and enemy actions and reactions are analyzed to determine 
potential branch and sequels to an operation.  TFR commander and 
planners failed to modify their tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
prevent helicopters from being shot down.  Once the first helicopter was 
shot down, commanders failed to take appropriate immediate actions to 
prevent other helicopters from being hit with an RPG.120   
 Somalia forced the army into unfamiliar missions in unfamiliar environments.  
Unsurprisingly, the army’s doctrine and training did not have a solution for every 
problem encountered by American forces.  Major Michael Winstead’s analysis of the 
10th Mountain Division’s difficulties in Somalia led him to call for “a common 
understanding and definition of the term force in U.S. Army Doctrine.”121  He concluded 
that force protection was a vital concept and that the army’s strategic leaders owed the 
tactical commanders a “comprehensive method to plan and execute his responsibilities in 
this realm.”122   
According to Major Timothy Karcher, the army needed more than just updated 
doctrine to retain its edge.  In his 2002 SAMS monograph, Karcher argued that that U.S. 
suffered from “Victory Disease” as a result of “a string of quick, decisive victories in the 
Caribbean and the Middle East, ending with the U.S.-led coalition’s overwhelming 
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victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.”123  As result of these successes the army 
became overconfident, complacent, and predictable, thus increasing its “likelihood of 
failure” in future conflicts.124  To Karcher, Somalia illustrated how these conditions 
coalesced into a recipe for disaster: 
In the case of TF Ranger in Mogadishu, the arrogant belief in the 
superiority of US forces combined with a complacent underestimation of 
the Somali opponent.  Along with these symptoms came the use of an 
established pattern by the members of TF Ranger, allowing the Somalis 
to seize the initiative.  In seizing the initiative, the Somalis were able to 
inflict significant casualties upon the US force, ultimately causing the US 
administration to abandon the mission in Somalia and withdraw US 
forces in “defeat.”125   
  
Karcher’s solution to the “Victory Disease” was to “vaccinate” army officers during 
their professional military education.  Although officers were already exposed to 
military history during their education, it was often focused on the successful portions of 
American military history and used to “broaden an officer’s understanding of the roots 
of current doctrine and tactics” and not focused on failed campaigns.126  By shifting the 
education system’s focus to include failed campaigns and defeats Karcher thought 
officers would be aware of the symptoms and root causes of victory disease and could 
avoid the potentially dangerous situation from developing.     
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Conclusion 
 
While Panama offered some challenges to the army, the conflict ended before the 
military could truly be tested.  Somalia on the other hand, was replete with challenges 
for the army and its leaders – and lessons for those that were willing to critically 
examine the conflict.  Many officers of many ranks did choose to examine the conflict, 
but with varying levels of criticality.  Some officers, such as General Powell who viewed 
Somalia as an analog for Vietnam, used Somalia merely as data point to confirm his pre-
existing idea.   Other officers, even general officers, were more critical in their 
assessments of the army’s performance and overall trajectory. 
 Generally, senior army officers viewed Somalia as a tactical success but an 
operational and strategic failure.  They attributed the failures principally to byzantine 
chains of command.  As a result, U.S. forces violated principles of war, specifically by 
not establishing unity of command and the associated unity of effort.  In the generals’ 
telling, these failings were largely the product of decisions forced upon them by UN 
resolutions, unclear U.S. policy, and untimely or unclear political decisions from 
Washington.  
The midgrade officers, despite sharing some of the same critiques as senior 
military leaders, were far more critical in their assessments of the army and its 
performance.  Many of these officers learned the dangers of mission creep from their 
experience and study of Somalia.  They argued that the ever-expanding mission and 
elusive end state prevented tactical units from fully preparing, understanding, or 
conducting their assigned missions.  While they recognized that these were partially the 
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result of poor policy decisions in Washington and elsewhere, these officers did not let 
generals off the hook.  Instead, some field grade officers charged their operational 
leaders for failing to provide an achievable end state, thus creating the conditions that led 
to failure.     
Some of these officers, Duffield and Karcher in particular, exposed troubling 
institutional and systemic failures.  Their arguments concerning the army’s ability to 
identify the opposition and its capabilities, correctly assess a situation, and adapt to 
changing conditions contradicted the  “thinking and learning institution where physical 
change is led by intellectual thought” that Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Commander William W. Hartzog described.127   
 The divergence in perspective between these groups sheds light on the role of 
professional experience and standpoint on lesson learning.  As in Panama before, 
Somalia seems to indicate a correlation between the length of an officers’ service and his 
or her willingness and ability to be critical of the army and its performance.  Regardless 
of the criticality of the officers involved or studying Somalia, many of the lessons 
learned in Somalia seemingly failed to impact the army at-large.  Many of the issues 
identified by these officers, such as arrogance, the inability to assess the tactical and 
strategic situation as well as the general lack of intellectual agility persisted in the army 
                                                 
127 Training and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-
Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, TRADOC Pamphlet 
525-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1994). 
 67 
 
as it entered Iraq and Afghanistan nearly a decade later – raising questions about the 
army’s willingness and ability to learn and adapt.   
68 
CHAPTER IV 
A CONTESTED VICTORY: ARMY OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE KOSOVO 
CAMPAIGN 
When the Berlin Wall fell, and Soviet Russia collapsed shortly thereafter, the 
United States found itself as the sole remaining superpower.  While an enviable position, 
it was also an unfamiliar one.  Military leaders were presented with a situation they were 
not accustomed to; they didn’t have a clear enemy to fight, or perhaps more accurately 
they didn’t have an enemy to prepare to fight.  Some in the army advocated staying the 
course, keeping the army large and relatively unchanged from its Cold War form, ready 
to fight and win large conventional battles.  In the early 1990s this conservative view 
dominated the army.  Officers with this perspective viewed operations such as Urgent 
Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, and Restore Hope in Somalia as aberrations, 
minor detours which shouldn’t alter the overall trajectory of the army.  The spectacular 
triumph of the U.S. led coalition during the Gulf War cemented the conservative position 
in the minds of many army leaders.  However, the conservative position became 
increasingly untenable as the U.S. combat experiences in the late 20th century failed to 
mesh with the leadership’s vision of what war should be.  If the Gulf War was the 
apogee of American conventional military power, the U.S. intervention in Somalia was 
its perigee.  Yet Somalia was not the only conflict in the 1990’s to challenge army 
officers’ perception of warfare and the army’s evolution.  Despite the army’s relatively 
minor involvement in Kosovo, military authors interpretations and conclusions were 
challenged.  Many of these officers concluded that the Kosovo campaign was further 
69 
indication that U.S. Army needed to evolve in order remain relevant.  This chapter 
explores those authors’ critiques of the army and its performance in Kosovo as well as 
their suggestions to improve its performance.128   
On the evening of March 24, 1999 President Bill Clinton addressed the nation 
and ordered the United States military to begin operations against President Slobodan 
Milošević and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY):  
My fellow Americans, today our Armed Forces joined our NATO allies 
in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in 
Kosovo. We have acted with resolve for several reasons. 
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a 
mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a 
powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this 
century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our 
allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting 
our interests, and advancing the cause of peace.129 
The United States, in conjunction with its NATO allies, launched an aerial campaign to 
halt the ethnic cleansing of Albanians and deter further aggressive action by Milošević.  
In doing so, NATO would be actively supporting the beleaguered Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), an army in name only that was described by many as a terrorist 
organization.  With lofty humanitarian goals in mind, a coalition of American, Canadian, 
Spanish, German, British, French, Italian, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, and Turkish air forces 
began an aerial campaign, hoping to avoid a war by intervening in one.  The plan was 
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straightforward, quick airstrikes to compel Milosevic to accept NATO’s conditions and 
prevent Serbian forces from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  However simple the plan, 
actually achieving the desired end state proved difficult.     
A History of Violence 
In order to understand the Kosovo campaign, one must at least have a cursory 
understanding of its people. Kosovo occupies a special place in the hearts and minds of 
Serbians as a foundational element of their national and ethnic identity. The Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389 and subsequent 500 years of Ottoman occupation of Serbian land looms 
large in Serbian historical memory and provided an impetus for revenge in the Serbian 
mind.  More often than not, that desire for revenge manifested in actions against 
Muslims throughout Yugoslavia.130    
Serbian historical memory both contributed to, and was co-opted by, a wave of 
ultra-nationalist leaders in the late 20th century seeking to right the wrongs of the past, 
almost always violently.   As president, Milošević whipped up nationalist frenzy that 
drove Serbians to seek revenge from Muslims in Yugoslavia.  First in Bosnia, and then 
in Kosovo, Serbian forces systematically targeted Muslims for harassment, intimidation, 
and even murder.  These actions set off a series of events that would eventually draw the 
ire of NATO in the mid 1990’s.  The particularly chilling Srebrenica massacre which 
resulted in the deaths of over 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks inside a NATO designated safe 
zone necessitated a response.  The ensuing NATO military operation, Deliberate Force, 
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was a fifteen-day bombing campaign consisting of 3,515 sorties (2,318 of which were 
flown by American aviators).131  International political pressure, combined with the 
judicious application of air power, forced Milošević to cease offensive operations and 
negotiate.  A mere twenty days after NATO bombings commenced, Serbian forces 
acquiesced to NATO demands and withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Although 
Operation Deliberate Force caused Milošević to abandon his goals in Bosnia, his 
predilection for ethnic cleansing and expansion of Serbian power had not abated.   
As Yugoslavia disintegrated, ethnic Albanians took note and Muslim Kosovars, 
the vast majority of which were ethnic Albanians, long discontented with their second 
class status in Kosovo, began to actively seek their independence in the mid-1990s.  One 
Albanian Kosovar was very clear about the lessons learned from his neighbors’ 
struggles: “we have learned from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia that the outside world 
cannot solve our problems for us.  We must fight for our own freedom.”132  Lacking a 
conventional military to fight the Serbs, Albanians instead turned to a shadowy and 
relatively unknown group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).  Beginning in 
1996 the KLA began a self-described “guerilla war to liberate Kosovo.”133  The opening 
phases of the KLA’s war of “liberation” was aimed at Serbian policemen and refugees.  
Although the KLA’s attacks were mostly symbolic, Milošević wasted no time in 
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responding and used the attacks as pretext for a massively disproportionate military 
response.  By the summer of 1998 some 200,000 Kosovars were displaced from their 
homes by Serbian military actions.134   
The U.S. and its NATO allies recognized the inherent dangers of instability in the 
Balkans and immediately made several diplomatic overtures to Milošević and Albanian 
separatists in the hope to avert yet another bloody civil war in the Balkans.135  At first 
diplomacy, backed up by threats of renewed bombing campaigns, seemed to have the 
desired effect – Serbian forces were restrained, redeployed, and many Kosovars returned 
to their homes.  However, the KLA used the pause to consolidate their power and 
prepare for future attacks against Serbian targets, thus continuing the cycle of violence.  
President Clinton initiated another round of diplomatic talks which ultimately ended in 
the Rambouillet Agreement, which was not signed by the Serbians.  The Clinton 
administration responded to Rabouillet’s failure with renewed threats of military force.  
Milošević retorted by launching Operation Horseshoe to “empty” Kosovo of its 
Albanians.  The U.S. and NATO, having had their bluff called by Milošević, were forced 
to act.  One the evening of 24 March 1999 President Clinton addressed the American 
people and informed them of his decision to use military force to protect the Albanian 
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people, uphold American values, protect American interests, and advance the cause of 
peace. 136  
Where the Rubber Meets the Road – Combat in Kosovo 
Spurred to action, NATO and U.S. planners devised Operation Allied Force, a 
three-phase military intervention which relied nearly exclusively on air power.  The 
objective of phase one of the operation was to destroy or disable Serbian air defenses.  
Phase two aimed to degrade Serbian military and paramilitary units to the point they 
were unable to continue ethnic cleaning. Phase three of the operation expanded the scope 
of the bombing to include additional targets in Serbia and non-military infrastructure.  
Allied Force was in many ways, simply an updated and expanded Deliberate Force.  
NATO planned to rely exclusively on air power to deliver victory, and to that end 
gathered a powerful force with an initial strength of 344 aircraft, 214 of which were 
American.137   
The war began with a salvo of cruise missiles and fixed-wing bomber sorties 
targeting more than 40 targets.138  Despite heavy attacks, Serbian air defenses remained 
intact.  In response the Serbs scrambled four MiG-29s and fired numerous surface to air 
missiles at NATO aircraft.  Although no NATO aircraft were shot down, allied air forces 
were forced to alter their tactics to counter the Serbian threat for the remainder of the 
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conflict.  The second and third nights of the campaign followed the same course as the 
first; NATO cruise missiles and bombs fell on Serbian targets throughout Kosovo while 
Serbian air defense systems and air force jets attempted, unsuccessfully, to interdict 
them.  Despite the attacks and damage done to Serbian military units, the atrocities in 
Kosovo continued.   
Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley K. Clark attributed Allied Force’s 
failure to achieve its goals to a lack of NATO intelligence and target acquisition 
capability, a problem exacerbated by a lack of ground forces.139  Whatever the cause for 
NATO’s shortcomings, public pressure intensified as the potential for a short and 
painless campaign seemed to evaporate.  To alleviate public pressure and provide a 
tangible result, NATO leaders systematically targeted FRY armored forces, especially 
tanks deployed in Kosovo.  This practice, known as tank-plinking, was possible due to 
the widespread use of Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and precision guided 
munitions.  Generals at various echelons of command focused their own personal efforts 
on directing the destruction of individual tanks on the battlefield from their headquarters 
hundreds or thousands of miles away.  In one revealing incident the pilot ordered to find 
and kill a lone Serbian tank was the son of NATO’s Joint Air Force Commander who 
protested when Clark and his father tried to direct his operation.140  Unfortunately for 
NATO and the beleaguered Kosovars, allied efforts to destroy tanks had little bearing on 
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the progress of the war or on Serbian’s ability to continue ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  It 
also contributed to doubts in Washington about Clark’s leadership of the campaign. Vice 
Chief of Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston, an air force officer 
himself, later complained that the aerial destruction of tanks “became the measure of 
merit that had nothing to do with reality . . . The tank, which was an irrelevant item in 
the context of ethnic cleansing, became the symbol for Serb ground forces.”141   
NATO planners initiated phase two of Allied Force on the night of 27 March.  
Although targeting lists changed slightly, phase two was nearly identical to phase one of 
the operation.  NATO and American aircraft continued to bomb Serbian targets with 
long-range precision munitions and continued to have limited effects on the broader 
Serbian military.  By late March Clark had concluded that “There’s nothing air power 
can do by itself to deter paramilitary forces from committing acts of brutality.”142 As 
March turned to April, the campaign plodded along with little real change until Serbian 
air defenses managed to shoot down an American F-117A Nighthawk and in a separate 
incident, capture three American soldiers along the Macedonian border.  With these 
military setbacks, increasing public pressure, and intensifying ethnic cleaning operations 
by Serbians in Kosovo, NATO leadership was forced to alter their strategy and 
considered the use of ground forces.  
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 Allied Force entered its third phase on the night of 1 April.  After disappointing 
progress, Allied planners were given far more leeway in choosing targets during phase 
three.  In addition to the additional targets, Allied Force strength swelled to over 1000 
aircraft, allowing General Clark to launch nearly 600 sorties per night.143  Despite the 
destruction caused by the bombing campaign, now reaching beyond Kosovo into Serbia 
proper, Serbian ground forces remained largely undeterred, eventually pushing General 
Clark to request an American ground task force to support the Allied Force.  The U.S. 
Army responded by deploying Task Force (TF) Hawk, a 5,500 soldier “impromptu 
assortment of tank-killing Apache attack helicopters, Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicles, artillery, engineers, air defense, and logistics support.”144  Although 
powerful, TF Hawk also required extensive logistical support and required nearly 24 
days and hundreds of air force heavy-lift missions to reach its forward staging area in 
Albania.145  When TF Hawk was ready, phase three of Allied Force was nearly half 
complete and American military leaders at the Pentagon deemed its use too risky due to 
vulnerability of the Apache helicopters to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. 
 The Pentagon’s decision left the KLA as the sole ground force operating in 
Kosovo.  Luckily for allied forces, the KLA launched a series of small offensive 
operations and increased its integration with NATO. Serbian units were forced to react 
to this new threat, and exposed themselves to withering aerial bombardment from NATO 
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aircraft.  Finally, NATO forces were able to directly influence events in Kosovo and turn 
the tide of battle.  Seventy-eight days after it began, the Kosovo campaign came to a 
close. Although hailed as a victory for the United States and NATO, Allied Force 
exposed several areas of concern for the U.S. Army.  
Lessons Learned, Lessons Remembered, and Lessons Forgotten – the Legacy of Kosovo 
 So what were the lessons that the U.S. Army learned in Kosovo?  How were 
these lessons learned and by whom?  Were the same lessons learned by all those who 
studied the conflicts?  Was there an army-wide agreement about the lessons learned in 
Kosovo? The following offers an overview of the lessons learned by American generals 
and field grade officers.  From even this cursory examination its it quite clear that there 
was no true consensus reached from the U.S. Army’s experience in Kosovo.  Senior 
American leaders often drew very different conclusions from the conflict than mid-grade 
officers who either carried out their orders or studied the campaign as part of their 
professional education.  
 Kosovo forced professional army officers to confront several uncomfortable 
truths about the U.S. Army of the late 1990s.  Even the staunchest of supporters would 
be hard pressed to describe the U.S. Army’s performance in Kosovo as anything more 
than adequate.  Not only was the army largely excluded from the original campaign plan 
to defeat Milošević, it also proved itself unable to swiftly and effectively respond to calls 
for support.  Task Force Hawk was a particularly embarrassing episode. It arrived in 
theatre far too late, with far too little capability, and with far too many restrictions on its 
use to significantly impact the campaign’s outcome.  While the army did eventually 
 78 
 
contribute to the effort, it did so mostly through counter-battery radar operations and 
targeting, both valuable contributions but decidedly underwhelming.    
The General Officer Perspective 
 By studying the memoirs, autobiographies, speeches, and other collected works 
of Kosovo’s general officers we can piece together the lessons they learned from the 
army’s involvement in Kosovo.  These officers examined a wide variety of issues facing 
the army in the closing years of the 20th century including structural challenges, 
adaptation for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the utility of tactical and 
strategic air power, and the future of warfare in the modern era.  Many of the lessons 
these senior officers learned in Kosovo confirmed their existing views. 
Structural Problems 
Many senior officers interpreted the Kosovo campaign as proof of their 
previously held conclusion that the army’s force structure was antiquated which 
adversely effected its ability to adapt to a rapidly evolving operational environment.  As 
an institution, the army was in the midst of a transformation and had experimented with 
Division XXI, Force XXI, Army After Next (AAN), and Strike Force in an attempt to 
modernize the army’s force structure and respond to changes in the post-Cold War 
security environment.146  To these officers, Kosovo represented proof that the army’s 
efforts were steps in the right direction and that the future of warfare required a more 
agile and adaptable force.   
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Two successive Army Chiefs of Staff believed their service had to become more 
modular and more mobile.  Modularity, or the ability to customize units to the specific 
requirements of a mission, was of particular interest to Army Chief of Staff Dennis 
Reimer’s AAN and Strike Force initiatives. 147  To Reimer and others, the need for 
flexibility resulted from the expanding requirements to render humanitarian aid, reduce 
instability, support governance, and other Military Operations MOOTWs.  Reimer 
concluded that the most expedient way to achieve the required flexibility was to make 
existing units more versatile and expandable, or in army parlance – more modular.  Task 
Force Hawk confirmed Reimer’s preexisting convictions:  
[Kosovo] was in my mind at least, a validation of the Strike Force 
concept. Because now we were considering a heavier ground force 
option, and if we go in with a ground force option the logical 
headquarters -- it would have to be beefed up, of course -- was V Corps. 
So I felt the need for the Strike Force concept really was demonstrated 
here.148 
 
General Reimer’s successor as Army Chief of Staff, Eric K. Shinseki, came to much the 
same conclusion:  
Since Task Force Hawk deployed to support the Kosovo operation in 
1999, it has become increasingly apparent that the unique demands of 
contemporary operations will often require specially designed task forces 
drawn from numerous units rather than the orderly deployment of a single 
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unit. Joint and combined headquarters and the like are going to be even 
more diverse in the specialties they draw on.149   
 
 
To both Reimer and Shinseki, Kosovo was a real-world test of the modular organization 
tested in the Division XXI, Force XXI, Army After Next, and Strike Force experiments.  
Although the army (and TF Hawk) wasn’t a modular force, both generals claimed it 
showed modularity’s potential and thus provided proof of concept. 
  In addition to modularity, senior officers maintained Kosovo demonstrated the 
army needed to be more strategically and tactically mobile.  Reimer claimed that TF 
Hawk’s slow deployment demonstrated an over-reliance on other services’ airlift and the 
army’s need to develop “new operational concepts” to enhance its own mobility.150  
Reimer’s immediate solution to the army’s mobility problems was pragmatic if not 
overly imaginative: expand transportation capacity and pre-position strategic 
equipment.151     In doing so, Reimer ignored a primary cause of immobility, that 
commanders’ aversion to risk and casualties led them to demand much heavier forces for 
an operation than were actually required, increasing both force size and logistical 
footprint.  Instead of addressing the cultural problems which caused – or at least 
exacerbated – the army’s mobility problems, Reimer merely sought to mitigate the 
effects.     
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 In similar manner, Shinseki postulated that Kosovo demonstrated the army’s 
heavy forces were too heavy to deploy in support of rapidly evolving contingencies and 
its light forces lacked sufficient lethality and survivability.152  Shinseki’s immediate 
solution was to create a medium-weight interim force, the Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team, that he claimed would combine the mobility of light forces with the lethality and 
survivability of heavier forces.153  Although Shinseki’s solution never fully materialized, 
it was an effort to address what he perceived as a root cause of the army’s lack of 
mobility.     
Reimer and Shinseki learned the same lessons from Allied Force, most notably 
that the army was on the correct track.  In their view, Kosovo confirmed the previous 
decade’s experiments with modularity and flexibility, some of which focused on the 
command structure and physical make-up of the U.S. Army.  The generals’ observations 
and conclusions from Kosovo were in-line with the army’s late 1990s organizational 
initiatives.  The generals, well-versed and invested in these transformative efforts, 
identified many of the same problems in Kosovo as they did in the pre-Kosovo army.   
Army Generals and Air Power 
As with structural problems, U.S. Army officers studied the use of air power 
thoroughly before Kosovo.  General Clark’s faith in air power as an instrument of 
coercive diplomacy was articulated over the course of several meetings with American 
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and foreign civilian leaders including the British Foreign Minister Robin Cook and 
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger.  Before the campaign, Clark believed that even 
the threat of aerial bombardment would cause Milošević to abandon his operations in 
Kosovo.154    He reiterated his belief that air power alone could achieve NATO’s 
objectives in a contentious exchange with Air Force General Joe Ralston.155  Clark based 
his assessments of U.S. capability and Serbian will on the lessons he had drawn from 
Deliberate Force in which a NATO aerial campaign was able to quickly and relatively 
painlessly impose NATO political objectives.   
Clark’s support of air strikes prior to the Kosovo war stand in stark contrast to his 
comments after the cessation of hostilities: 
We should be careful, though, about extolling the air operation in Kosovo 
as a pattern for future success, for it also manifestated [sic] the limits of 
air power, even high technology air power, as an independent military 
instrument.  In this manner the air campaign provided clear warnings 
about the direction of some U.S. military thinking.156 
 
One interpretation of Clark’s revised viewpoint is that it was an evolution in his views 
on the usefulness of air power alone as a coercive agent in foreign policy.  A second 
interpretation is that Clark’s change was due to disenchantment with Pentagon 
leadership over targeting and strategy.  A third, and more cynical view, is that Clark 
reinterpreted events to make it appear as if he had been right from the start, bolstering 
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his image as a military visionary and anti-establishment figure in order to bolster future 
political aspirations. 
          Clark’s doubts about air power, however delayed, were in contrast to media 
coverage of Kosovo which proclaimed “air power alone can win some kind of victory” 
and “[the air campaign is] a refutation of the common wisdom that air power alone 
cannot make a despot back down.”157   The U.S. Army had long contended that “boots 
on the ground” were required to win wars.  Kosovo seemed to many analysts to be a 
refutation of the army, its arguments, and its place in national security.  The air force’s 
triumph, combined with TF Hawk’s problems underscored what some military observers 
and analysts had been contending since the end of the Cold War nearly a decade earlier, 
that the U.S. Army was trained and structured to fight a war that was never coming.   
 Kosovo exposed more than just the vulnerability of air-only military campaigns.  
It also caused at least one senior military leader to question coercive diplomacy and 
proportional responses.  While Kosovo was not the genesis of such ideas, it reinforced 
the view that American military power may not be the most efficient or effective means 
of achieving American political intent.   Reimer expressed his misgivings about using 
armed force to achieve humanitarian goals:     
as things emerged most of the Joint Chiefs did not feel that use of military 
force in Kosovo was in our vital national interest and probably would not 
have recommended the use of force in Kosovo. There was a split in that 
area, because I think some of us did feel that force might be necessary, 
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but most of us, fair to say, felt like Kosovo was not in the national 
interest.158 
He was also critical of NATO’s unwillingness to use overwhelming force from the 
beginning of Allied Force and later recalled: “I still believe, and have believed for a long 
time, that when you make the decision to use military force, you go in with 
overwhelming force and put all your options on the table, don’t take them off. In the end 
it is over quicker and with less casualties.”159     
 Reimer’s recollections are as interesting as they are problematic.  His comments 
are in line with standard understandings of military theory and have a logical 
consistency, yet they do not match the NATO’s plan or goals in Kosovo.  In many ways, 
Allied Force could be seen as the opposite of an effort to use overwhelming military 
force and instead placed severe limitations on the type and size of military response 
being considered.  Only when defeat seemed plausible were allied leaders finally able 
amend their plans and bring overwhelming force to bear.    
Adaptation for Occupation 
Military campaigns do not simply end after hostilities and there are often many 
lessons to be learned after the fighting.  But in order for lessons to be learned someone 
must want to learn them, something which at least one senior officer accused the army as 
an organization of not wanting to do.  General Ricardo Sanchez served as the assistant 
division commander of the 1st Infantry Division during the Kosovo campaign.  Although 
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his position was largely a supporting one, Sanchez was an integral part of planning and 
resourcing the operation.  His positioned afforded him a unique perspective on the 
planning of Allied Force.  As part of the army’s lesson learning initiatives General 
Sanchez was required to submit an After Action Review (AAR) to senior leaders at the 
Pentagon following the conflict.  Sanchez recommended the following in his AAR:    
1. For the first twelve to eighteen months after combat operations, or 
until a civilian organization has its capacity deployed, the U.S. 
military must have both the responsibility and authority for the 
mission.  It is the only organization that has the strategic and 
operational planning capacity, the command, control, and 
communications, and the logistics capacity necessary for success in 
such an environment. 
2. A grand strategy must be in place before hostilities commence.  
Operations in Kosovo were being conducted in a strategic and 
operational vacuum due to a lack of a clearly defined vision for the 
province.  Due to a lack of consensus over Kosovo’s future, the 
governmental, nongovernmental, national, and international 
organizations constantly struggled with competing objectives. 
3. The headquarters staff must have the manpower, processes, and 
expertise to tackle the daily complex strategic, operational, and 
tactical challenges of the mission. 
4. Units deployed on such missions need national-level support and 
assistance on a “push” basis in order to succeed. 160 
With the hindsight provided by a decade of attempted nation building in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is tempting to exaggerate the significance of General Sanchez’s 
conclusions and upon further consideration, many of them do not hold up to scrutiny.  
 While Sanchez rightly points out that a lack of governance is a bad thing, his 
solution – military governance – was problematic.  Nation building requires a different 
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skillset than combat.  To truly embrace a nation building role the army would have to 
significantly modify its force structure and training at the cost of preparing for combat 
operations.  Sanchez’s conclusion that the U.S. needed “a grand strategy” before 
initiating hostilities is myopic and indicates Sanchez’s view of war as an engineering 
problem.  No plan, however grand and well thought out can account for every 
eventuality in a conflict and predicating American military action on completing such an 
impossible task is imprudent.  Sanchez’s calls for additional national-level support were 
also misguided.  U.S. and NATO shortcomings in Kosovo – a limited regional war that 
consumed far more resources than anticipated – were less the result of a lack of 
resources than how those resources were utilized. Indicative of such misappropriated 
resources was TF Hawk, which spent much of the campaign in neighboring Albania 
watching the war.  If additional national-level resources were committed to Kosovo it is 
not incomprehensible to image them being unused. 
Whether or not Sanchez’s arguments were well-founded or misguided, his 
observations and recommendations largely fell on deaf ears: “I filed my Kosovo After 
Action Report according to procedure.  But it went into a Pentagon file cabinet and died 
there.”161  Sanchez’s inability to persuade leaders in the army and civilian government as 
a senior leader illuminates army’s limitations as a learning institution.  If a general 
couldn’t facilitate organizational change, what chance did lower level officers have? 
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Sanchez was not the only general that contemplated post-combat operations after 
the army’s involvement in Kosovo.  In his 2010 autobiography General Hugh Shelton 
noted as had occurred in Haiti and Bosnia, and then in Kosovo “the greatest demand for 
troops followed the actual war fighting, when the requirements turned to providing a 
safe and secure environment so that the new government, assisted by our government, 
turned to the “nation building” phase.”162  Although Shelton’s conclusions are 
interesting, we must remember that his autobiography was published in 2010 when he 
had good reason to distance himself from the decisions which led to the invasion of Iraq 
and its under-manned and under-planned occupation.   
 As of the writing of this work, the United States and its NATO allies still have an 
armed presence in Kosovo.  The post-combat operations following the seventy-eight 
days of Allied Force have lasted for 16 years.  It could be argued that Kosovo’s most 
important lessons for future military operations came after cessation of hostilities.  Both 
Sanchez and Shelton recognized the difficulties and importance of winning (or at the 
very least not losing) the final phase of the operation. Both men personally learned from 
their experiences in post-combat operations in Kosovo, but the army as an institution 
seemingly did not.  
Trouble in High Places 
General Clark’s relationship with his fellow generals during the Kosovo 
campaign was strained at best, and contentious at its worst. Before Allied Force began, 
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Shelton concluded Clarks’ campaign plan was so poor that he and other senior leaders 
had to rewrite it.163  Later, during the execution of the campaign, Shelton discovered that 
Clark “didn’t know the planning cycle on air operations even though the entire mission 
is on big air operation” something he termed “nothing short of terrifying.”164  Perhaps 
most disturbing to Shelton was his belief that Clark’s ego compromised his ability to 
lead and that he was a “loose cannon and absolutely in it for whatever was best for 
Wes.”165  Shelton also took issue with Clark’s public persona and interaction with the 
media:  
One thing that did not get any better was Wes’s unfortunate inability to deal 
effectively with the press.  To put it bluntly, for a smart guy he said some pretty 
dumb things. . . I called Wes as requested: “The Secretary has asked me to 
deliver the following message, and I quote: get your fucking face off the TV.  No 
more briefings, period.  That’s it.”166 
 
Shelton’s scathing critique of Clark labeled him as professionally and personally 
deficient – a damning condemnation from one senior leader to another. 
For his part, Clark claimed the he, Shelton, and Reimer fundamentally disagreed 
on the war’s strategy from the beginning.  He maintained that from the beginning he had 
advocated for a wider and more decisive military action targeting not only FRY military 
forces, but Milošević’s support structure: 
The way I looked at it, the point of the campaign was either to break 
Milošević’s will (or the will of his supporters) or, ultimately deny him the 
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capability to continue the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  On the strategic 
level, we continued to push for approval to attack the strategic 
communications targets, including TV stations, key bridges, and electric 
power stations – high profile elements of Milošević’s system for 
command, control, and sustainment of the Armed Forces in Yugoslavia.  
That was one center of gravity.  But the Serb ground forces were another 
center of gravity, and they were the priority.167 
 
Clark’s vision for the Kosovo campaign, as well as the means by which he desired to 
achieve it, were fundamentally different than leaders in Washington, a fact which put 
him into direct conflict with senior military and civilian leadership and sowed the seeds 
of his eventual demise. 
 Given the quarrelsome relationship between Clark and others it is unsurprising 
that Clark’s conclusions from Kosovo were different than that of any other senior 
officer.  Clark viewed Kosovo as a defining moment in U.S., NATO history, and 
military history representing a new breed of conflict that he assessed would be the “new 
normal.”  He contended that small, limited wars like Kosovo, waged in support of 
regional stability and humanitarian assistance were far more likely than large scale 
conflicts like Korea and Iraq.168  In contrast others, particularly Reimer, viewed Kosovo 
as a one-shot deal that was unlikely to be repeated and perhaps was not in the nation’s 
strategic interests.  
 The general officers that reflected on Kosovo, despite being a small group linked 
by professional education, training exercises, and careers’ worth of deployments, drew a 
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variety of conclusions from their experience in Kosovo.  The “official” lessons learned 
from Kosovo confirmed pre-operational priorities such as the need to be more modular 
and mobile.  Kosovo also reinforced army’s officers’ critique of air power and the use of 
military force to achieve humanitarian aims.  It illustrated to generals the importance of 
post-combat operations – while also highlighting the institution’s uneasiness with these 
missions.  Lastly, Kosovo also exposed a group of senior leaders that despite decades of 
shared experiences, still could be deeply divided over matters of professional 
competency and character.    
The Field-Grade Officer Perspective  
 General officers were not the only officers that studied Kosovo to draw 
conclusions about the army’s performance and future.  Another group of officers – field-
grade officers – observed and studied the same conflict as the generals yet learned 
different lessons, even when they were discussing the same or similar topics.  As a result 
of their age, experience, and position, these officers’ perspective differed from their 
superiors, a fact which influenced their conclusions and positions. 
Casualty Aversion 
 Where general officers tended to interpret Kosovo as confirming the need for 
organizational restructuring, mid-grade officers tended to interpret it as revealing 
cultural problems.   Many also saw structural faults and largely agreed with points made 
by Shinseki and Reimer but in their minds, structural problems were not root causes of 
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the army’s difficulties in Kosovo. 169  One cultural problem these officers critiqued was 
the army’s aversion to casualties.  In the 1990s and early 2000s it was commonly 
accepted among army officers that military operations were being adversely affected by 
the unwillingness of the American people, political leaders, and military leaders to 
tolerate any loss of U.S. troops.170  In his 2000 SAMS monograph Major Jonathon 
Moelter argued that American involvement in Kosovo and America’s other small wars 
indicated five trends of international concern:  
(1) Aversion to casualties challenges US international leadership and 
credibility; (2) The US’s presumed sense of invulnerability may result in 
preemptive attacks by the US; (3) A presumed strategy of zero casualties 
may directly shape US foreign relations; (4) Potential enemies can see US 
casualty aversion as an exploitable weakness; and (5) Past acts of 
apparent US casualty aversion continue to influence America’s war on 
terrorism.171   
 
He concluded that it was in the United States’ best interests to reverse this perception 
and that although unnecessary casualties should be avoided,  the potential loss of troops 
should not “interfere with achieving U.S. national or military objectives.”172   
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 Major Perry Rearick’s 2001 Master’s Thesis examined the relationship between 
force protection between mission accomplishment.  He claimed that U.S. military 
leadership viewed causalities as unacceptable, a fact which had a detrimental effect on 
its ability to accomplish its mission Kosovo and more generally in all future military 
operations.  Rearick identified four ways in which casualty aversion impacted mission 
accomplishment: (1) protecting the force was a stated mission (2) force protection hinder 
American forces’ ability to build rapport with locals (3) differences in force protection 
measures between allied countries eroded mutual confidence and (4) force protection 
measures were developed in parallel with a unit’s mission rather than as an aspect of 
accomplishing the unit’s primary mission.  Instead of placing force protection in the 
context of combat power, he argued it rivaled the importance of mission 
accomplishment, ultimately endangering “the Army’s relevance to the nation.”173     
 Major Robert Ault’s 2003 SAMS monograph concluded that the army’s 
professional education program and its training practices produced officers who were 
risk averse.  He worried  that unless there was a “shift in cultural mindset through a 
refined education process rather than implementing changes to training and scenarios” 
the  “next generation of officers may be brought up in a culture where obedience is 
equated to loyalty and fighting the plan is more important than fighting the enemy.”174  
To Ault, the army stood on a dangerous precipice, moving towards a technocratic culture 
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and away from a warrior culture which to his mind, was a radical and dangerous 
departure.175 
Moelter, Ault, and Rearick’s field-grade perspective provided a counterpoint to 
the perspective of their senior officers.  Reimer and Shinseki concluded that the army’s 
problems were the results of command structure and equipment and by fixing those 
problems, the army’s performance could be addressed.  The field grade officers viewed 
the problem less as structural than cultural, singling out what they say as both a civilian 
and military unwillingness to risk lives.  In retrospect, the example of TF Hawk’s 
deployment appears to support the field grade officers.  Although late, TF Hawk did 
eventually arrive on the battlefield and was prepared to engage in combat operations.  
The decision not to employ TF Hawk was not based on command relationships or 
equipment problems, but on the generals’ estimation of the risk to reward ratio of the 
operation.  To the generals, the vulnerability of the Apache helicopters, predictable flight 
paths, and lack of readily identifiable targets made the employment of TF Hawk too 
risky.176  The generals considered the relationship between tactical risk and reward when 
considering the employment of TF Hawk.  To Ault, Moelter, Rearick and others, this 
showed that accomplishing the mission was less important than preserving American 
lives.  These authors criticized the behavioral and cognitive norms of army officers and 
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army culture which by extension was also a critique of the stewards of their profession – 
the general officers.    
A Crisis of Leadership 
Generals and field-grade officers were not always in opposition to one another 
regarding the lessons learned in Kosovo.  One topic that united some senior and mid-
level officers were their critiques of senior military leadership.  Major Michael 
Johnson’s 2000 SAMS monograph examined the application of Clausewitzian dialectics 
in the Kosovo campaign.  Johnson faulted senior military leadership and claimed that 
senior leaders failed to develop the appropriate contingency plans to support a failure of 
their assumptions.177  This officer also contended that military and civil leaders rejected 
the principle of annihilation because “they misunderstood the nature of war.”178  He 
argued that that General Clark and others were unable or unwilling to objectively 
analyze the crisis in Kosovo, leading to the perpetuation of what he termed “Kosovo 
myths.”179  In Johnson’s view, Clark’s (and other senior officers’) inability to reach an 
objective conclusion contributed to the failure of future strategies and policies by not 
accurately and honestly providing feedback of their experiences, or as he terms it, did 
“not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian.”180  Johnson’s critiques struck at the 
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generals’ strategic, if not  professional competence and called in question their ability to 
translate theory into practice.     
 Major Kelly Synder’s 2001 Command and General Staff College master’s thesis 
concluded the army’s experience in America’s small wars and the Kosovo campaign 
taught the army the importance of small-scale contingencies and Military Operations 
Other than War (MOOTW) but senior leaders were reluctant to make real and lasting 
change in army doctrine or strategy.181  She maintained that general officers failed to 
adapt to changing conditions despite observing them and themselves concluding that 
MOOTW would play an increasing role in the army’s mission.  Synder suggested army 
culture was still clinging to a Cold War view of conflict despite mounting evidence of its 
obsolescence, calling into question the army’s ability to learn and adapt. 
 Other officers critiqued senior leadership for being unable to establish a common 
picture of the Kosovo campaign and create a united front.  In his examination of the 
structural influences on the conflicts between presidents and military commanders, 
Major Michael Baim highlighted the impact of policy differences between presidents 
and senior military commanders charged with carrying out their orders.  Baim contended 
that policy differences often end with the military commander being removed from 
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command, as occurred to General Clark following the Kosovo campaign.182  In his view, 
such a division presented “the adversary with exploitable opportunities.”183  
 To field officers such as Baim, Gregory, and Synder the senior American 
leadership was partially to blame for the U.S. Army’s mediocre performance in Kosovo.   
They saw both cultural and systemic problems that defied quick or easy fixes and would 
require considerable effort, time, and introspection.   
Air Power 
Air power is alluring to the American people, policy makers, and military leaders 
alike.  President and generals have sought to wage surgical air war many times with 
varying degrees of success; Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, Operation El Dorado Canyon 
in Libya, Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, and Operations Deny Flight and later 
Operation Deliberate Force in the Balkans.  Despite their ardent desire to move beyond 
the need for ground forces, reality has prevented American leaders from doing so.  
Operation Allied Force was very much in the same vein, an attempt by the U.S. to exert 
its will while avoiding damage.  As the many aerial campaigns before had taught 
military leaders, the Kosovo campaign proved to be a cautionary tale of the limits of air 
power. 
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Several field-grade authors contemplated the limitations of air power in Kosovo.  
In her 1999 SAMS monograph Major Jody Blanchfield’s concluded that Kosovo’s 
environment hampered NATO air forces’ ability to effectively engage ground forces: 
Airpower may not always be an effective means of targeting different 
threats. Large-scale conventional ground forces may be very vulnerable 
to air attack as they were in Iraq’s open desert during Desert Storm. 
However, Allied Force illustrates how difficult it can be to effectively 
target them in an urban environment.184   
 
She deduced that Kosovo demonstrated a determined enemy in an austere environment 
was unlikely to be defeated by air power alone.  Environmental challenges were not the 
only obstacles that faced allied efforts in Kosovo.  Blanchfield maintained that the 
Kosovo campaign plan was flawed and that any expectation of victory from an “air-
only” campaign was a risky proposition.  She contended that even an aerial campaign of 
immense force that incorporated economic and diplomatic power did not guarantee 
victory.185  Even if air power could deliver victory, the type of victory it could achieve 
was also problematic and did not address the root causes which caused the conflict.186    
 Other authors also believed air power had serious flaws and limitations.  Major 
Robert Gregory argued that American leaders forgot a century’s worth of hard-won 
combined arms operations knowledge by relying solely on air power in Kosovo.   In his 
view the campaign’s objectives were threatened  by NATO’s failure to integrate air 
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power with a ground maneuver  force at the beginning of the campaign.187  He was 
concerned  that allied leaders had concluded air power alone had delivered victory in 
Kosovo and that they would use it as a template for future air campaigns.188  Gregory 
rejected their overly air-centric conclusions, and instead argued that the last hour 
addition of TF Hawk and its counter battery radars were critical to finally tipping the 
balance of power in the NATO’s favor.189 
 Army leaders were presented with an interesting problem after Kosovo: how 
would they ensure that the army was still viewed as a relevant force required for the 
nation’s security after a war that was seemingly won by air power alone?  Most of the 
field grade officers argued that the narrative suggesting air-only campaigns were the 
future of warfare were false narratives.  These authors concluded that air power would 
only be successful when combined with a viable ground maneuver force.  In their minds, 
Kosovo supported their case and the belated arrival of TF Hawk played a critical role in 
the final stages of the conflict and pushed the Serbian military to the breaking point.   
Conclusion 
Most military and civilian analysts concluded that in Kosovo the U.S. Army had 
been misused in Allied Force.  Where they differed was in their assessment of the causes 
of the army’s difficulties and their analysis of the applicability of Kosovo’s challenges to 
future conflict.  In this way, Kosovo seemingly offered contradictory lessons.  Kosovo 
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both confirmed the senior leadership’s desire to reform force structure and provided 
more critical authors a disturbing view of the army’s problems.  General and field grade 
officers observed the same events, but drew very different conclusions about their 
relevance and causes.  But why?  Why would professional officers, products of similar 
societal conditions and military education system differ so greatly in their observations 
and conclusions?  As in Somalia and Panama before, we find that perspective and prior 
experience fundamentally altered authors’ observations and conclusions.  
The army’s transformation in the 1990s, begun by Sullivan and continued by 
Reimer and Shinseki, focused on making the army more mobile and modular.  By virtue 
of their positions, senior officers were personally and professionally invested in the 
army’s analysis and transformative efforts, facts which influenced their observations and 
conclusions.  Shinseki’s observations that American formations in Kosovo were either 
too unwieldy to rapidly deploy in support of contingency operations or lacked the ability 
to stay and fight for extended periods were extensions of the army’s pre-Kosovo 
analysis.  His conclusions mirrored the goal of the army’s transformation – the army 
must be more mobile and modular to remain relevant. 
Field-grade officers shared the generals’ critiques of the army’s force structure 
but disagreed on its place as the root cause of the problems.  These officers viewed the 
army’s culture as the cause of its poor performance.  They believed that the army’s 
insistence on casualty avoidance put its ability to accomplish assigned missions at risk.  
By virtue of their rank the mid-level officers were closer to the troops and were 
personally responsible for implementing the generals’ orders.  It is not surprising then, 
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that these authors drew more “people-based” conclusions than their superiors, focusing 
on things like individual training and small-unit culture.     
To outside observers, Kosovo appeared to vindicate the U.S. and NATO’s 
reliance on air power to deliver victory even in an austere environment against a 
determined foe.  But a deeper examination of the conflict, its participants, and the 
authors that studied it yield a more nuanced perspective on Kosovo and the lessons 
learned there.  Different lessons were learned by different participants and students of 
the conflict.  The divergence between the lessons learned can, broadly speaking, be 
attributed to differences in perspectives of the participants and authors.  The perspective 
of the general and field-grade officer was critical to their understanding and 
contextualization of Kosovo.  Both perspectives yielded valuable lessons about the U.S. 
Army and its role in national security.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS: THE NEXT GENERATION 
As historian Brian Linn argues, “a military institution’s concept of war is a composite of 
its interpretation of the past, its perception of present threats, and its prediction of future 
hostilities.”190  At its core, this work is an examination of the army’s concept of war in 
the 1990s.  Contrary to the appearance of service consensus offered by the army’s 
official histories, this thesis argues that there was a rigorous internal debate between 
mid-level and senior officers over the army’s perceptions of war in the last decade of the 
20th century.  Senior officers interpreted the army’s experiences as affirmation of their 
notions of war, which validated their careers and the overall trajectory of the army.  
Field-grade officers challenged these interpretations.  They believed that the army’s 
experiences in this era exposed flaws in the army’s doctrine, training, and institutions. 
This divergence in perspective forces us to ask many questions about lesson 
learning and institutional memory within a hierarchical organization.  One of the primary 
questions to consider is why these officers, which were products of similar civil and 
military cultures, viewed the same events but came to different – and sometimes 
contradictory – conclusions.  Further, we must consider what the debates between these 
officers can teach us about the debates within the contemporary army. 
J. P. Clark posits that “the [existing] scholarship of military adaptation offers 
three broad causes for change: external direction that overcomes military conservatism, 
190 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 233.  
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internal direction emanating from a visionary leader, or an institutional reaction to an 
external shock.”191  But are these explanations sufficient to explain the dynamics at work 
in the 1990s army?  The army did experience outside pressure to change, primarily 
through the budget cuts and reductions in size, but neither had a transformative effect.  
Likewise, some army leaders attempted to enact changes in force structure and 
composition by moving to a more modular army, but their efforts were stymied by 
budgetary restrictions.  Lastly, although external shocks occurred, especially in Somalia, 
the reactions from senior leaders and the army’s institutions were muted.  The officers 
that advocated broader change were seemingly drowned out by the status quo.  Although 
elements from each of the causes for change outlined by Clark were present in the 
1990s, none seem to fully account for the internal dialog covered by this study.  How 
then can we account for the conflicting viewpoints and conclusions of these officers? 
In his study of the contemporary U.S. Army Clark posits that there is a fourth 
force for change: “a series of generational shifts . . . arising from trends far deeper than 
any single event [that] caused the change in thinking that created the new military 
professionalism.”192  Clark’s theory seems well-suited to describe the army of the 1990s 
which was comprised of two distinct generations of army officers. The first were those 
officers that served in the Vietnam War, which by the 1990s were senior officers.  As 
historian Andrew Bacevich contends, their experiences in Vietnam were “the pivot 
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around which all else” turned and shaped their post-Vietnam experiences.193  The second 
generation of officers were from the post-Vietnam army and were serving in mid-level 
positions during this time.  Without Vietnam as a defining experience in their 
professional lives they were more apt to challenge conventional wisdom and draw 
unique conclusions about their and the army’s experiences.  When observed through the 
lens of Clark’s generational divide, there is a clear distinction between the conclusions 
and arguments of the two generations – and a plausible explanation for the diverging 
perspectives identified by this thesis.   
Armed with a clearer understanding of what happened and a plausible 
explanation of why, we can now grapple with the broader implications of this study.  I 
contend that the army’s experience during the 1990s serves as a useful analog for 
understanding the challenges facing today’s army.  The army of the 1990s was a 
recovering one.  The end of the Cold War and subsequent “peace dividend,” combined 
with successful campaigns in Panama and Iraq convinced American leadership that the 
army could and should be reduced in size.  The result was a dramatic reduction of the 
force.  In 1985 the army had over 780,000 active-duty soldiers; a decade later there were 
a little over 508,000.194  Paradoxically, the dramatic reduction in strength occurred while 
the army assumed new roles and missions – primarily of the MOOTW variety – across 
the globe.  The expansion of the army’s mission was not a new phenomenon.  Brian 
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Linn argues that “after every conflict, the US Army not only recovers most of its prewar 
responsibilities but also inherits some new ones. . . . During the 10-year recovery period 
of the Gulf War, the US Army was deployed in a series of frantic and often ambiguous 
missions in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and numerous other places as Defense Secretary 
Les Aspin Jr. boasted he could simultaneously restructure the nation’s armed forces and 
do more with less.”195    
Today’s army faces much the same situation as it did nearly twenty years ago.  
However, instead of recovering from a resounding victory in the Middle East, it is 
recuperating after more than a decade of constant use, or as some would argue, misuse.  
Despite the prolonged period of exertion, the army’s ability to advance U.S. national 
interests abroad is hotly debated.  However, one fact is clear, today’s army has resumed 
its pre-Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) responsibilities while assuming new ones.  
The army continues to fight in the Middle East, North Africa, and to a lesser extent 
Central Asia.  The GWOT is seems, has been rebranded but not retired.  These struggles 
continue to play out as a resurgent Russia, defiant China, and volatile North Korea seek 
to expand their influence and exploit what they likely perceive as a distracted and 
vulnerable U.S.  These problems are complicated by the simultaneous reductions in 
army force size from its peak of 566,045 soldiers in 2010 to 464,736 in December 
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2016.196  One could be forgiven if they thought Les Aspin’s boast that “he could 
simultaneously restructure the nation’s armed forces and do more with less” was made in 
2016 rather than 1993.197    
If we use this study, Clark’s generational divide, and Linn’s analysis of postwar 
recoveries, its seems likely that the army’s immediate future will include a vigorous 
debate amongst its officers over the meaning of army’s experience during the GWOT.  
Just as divisions emerged between Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam officers in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a division is likely to appear between GWOT and post-GWOT professionals 
in the 2020s and beyond.  The question then becomes, a matter of what to do about – or 
with – the expected divergence of perspectives.  First, we must recognize that each 
generation, which is a product of its unique culture and experiences, “will bring its own 
attitudes, strengths, and weaknesses” to the profession of arms.198  Secondly, we must 
acknowledge the value of dissent and alternative viewpoints.  Although some view the 
army as a strict hierarchical organization that is resistant to critique, the existence of 
CGSC and SAMS attest to the fact that the army believes it is better to encourage its best 
and brightest to, to some degree, question the authority of the broader institution and its 
senior leaders.  Recognizing both the inevitability, and the value of free-thinking and 
(reasonable) dissent, this thesis is a clear recommendation to encourage officers to 
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continue to engage in meaningful debate and for the army to sincerely engage with its 
officers. 
Although only two decades removed from the writing of this thesis, many of the 
army’s experiences during the 1990s seemed to have already faded from historical 
memory – if indeed they were incorporated in the first place.  As America’s small wars 
were largely overshadowed by the Persian Gulf War, so too has the 1990s been 
overshadowed by the 2000s and the Global War on Terror.  Despite the intervening time 
and events, there are similarities between the two decades that merit consideration.  
Then, as now, officers vigorously debated a wide variety of important topics such as the 
effectiveness of the army’s training, doctrine, and leadership.  As such, the history of 
America’s small wars and the officer corps’ perceptions of them offers to teach both 
soldiers and scholars many lessons.     
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